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Abstract. The paper organizes the topic of signs in Lev Vygotsky’s various writings 
into a coherent whole in order to study signs’ role in child development. Vygotsky 
related conventional signs that have their origin in interpersonal communication, and 
are subject to cultural history taking place over generations during historical time, to 
psychological functioning of individual human beings. Vygotsky’s “natural history of 
signs” is the study of how symbolic activity appears and develops. The paper outlines 
the process of inclusion of symbols within the behaviour of the child and gives an 
account of various changes in psychological functions and their interrelations that it 
brings along. In cultural development specifically human forms of behaviour appear, 
and children’s relationship to social and material environment is changed qualitatively. 
Vygotsky outlines the formation of sign use and analyses its developmental steps. 
Vygotsky’s approach explains how the use of various sign systems shapes both the 
cognitive processes in the person, the child, and the cognitive development as a whole. 
Vygotsky’s approach to signs is presented within the conceptual framework of its time.
Keywords: development of symbols; development of sign use; signs as tools; symbolic 
activity; cognitive development
Introduction
Lev Vygotsky’s (1896–1934) works have enjoyed great popularity in recent 
years, supported by a rising number of their new publications, interpretations 
and re-evaluations in English. Besides developmental and cultural psychology, 
Vygotsky’s approach has also been slowly gaining ground in semiotics, especially 
in its educational applications (e.g. Liu 2011; Robbins 2001, 2003). Thanks to 
several collections of works by various authors, edited by James Wertsch (e.g. 
Wertsch 1985a; Daniels et al. 2007), and of course his own writings (e.g. Wertsch 
1985b; 1985c; 1991), Vygotsky’s approach has to some extent been acknowledged 
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as semiotic in its core. Yet as concerns the interpretations of semiotic topics in 
Vygotsky’s works in psychology, signs have remained secondary or marginal 
compared to the focus on psychological processes, and therefore under-reflected 
in terms of semiotic theory. Often, Vygotsky’s writings on signs have been adopted 
for semiotics and psychology only in fragments, which have left either a one-sided 
or even a contradicting impression of them. In addition, while being discussed in 
psychology, education, and semiotics, it is particularly his treatment of the topic 
of signs that has been mostly covered only from the distinct point of view of signs 
as tools. The extent to which signs take the dominant central part in his approach 
has thus been realized much less. The present paper aims to improve this situation 
by collecting and organizing Vygotsky’s writings on signs into a coherent whole. 
The paper outlines a psychological and developmental approach to signs, as well 
as a study of the role of culture in the individual development of humans.
Vygotsky’s approach to signs provides a framework for research into a variety 
of specifically semiotic topics regarding the development of signs and sign use 
in children. By organizing Vygotsky’s concept of signs, this study brings together 
various aspects of the problem of children’s “cultural development”. It relates the 
use of cultural sign systems, which are developed during historical time – e.g. 
language, writing, gestures, etc. – to different psychological functions such as, 
among others, perception, attention, memory, practical problem solving and tool 
use, which develop in the individual, providing an integrative cognitive theory 
of signs. By doing that, it gives a developmental account of the acquisition of the 
use of these signs systems, and at the same time, an account of the concomitant 
changes that take place in the psychological functions. It also provides an analysis 
of the dynamics of changing relationships between these functions in such a way 
that acquisition of sign use reorganizes them in relation to one another from a 
higher level. As a result of this development, the signs that children learn to use 
change, giving ground to new psychological functions, which are based on their 
inclusion, forming a history of signs and their use that is, to a degree, independent 
of the processes of organic maturation. This study provides a broad framework for 
studying the relationship between culturally shared sign systems and the cognitive 
development of children.
Sources regarding the topic of signs in Vygotsky’s works
Vygotsky’s views on development and signs evolved considerably over his short, 
but very productive career in psychology in the late 1920s and early 1930s. As with 
other author-centred discussions, the question is to what extent his works form a 
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consistent whole, and to what extent truthfulness and authenticity to his original 
writings depends on including their full extent. A short outline of sources used for 
this paper and the principles of their selection is in order, as well as a discussion 
of some of the problems with using these sources.
The main sources for the present study include “The problem of the cultural 
development of the child” dating from 1929 (Vygotsky 1994[1929]); “Tool and 
symbol in child development”1 from 1930 (Vygotsky, Luria 1994); “The history of 
the development of higher psychological functions” from 1931 (Vygotsky 1997); 
and “Thinking and speech” from 19342 (Vygotsky 1986[1934]).
The first of these outlines the so-called cultural-historical theory; the second 
adds in detail what acquisition of symbols brings to practical thinking and 
cognition, including a comparison with Köhler’s (1925[1921]) findings in species 
other than human; the third provides somewhat more detailed descriptions of 
Vygotsky’s and his colleague’s experiments regarding symbols, and explains 
what symbols bring to various psychological functions, e.g. perception, memory, 
attention, practical problem solving, to name but a few; and the last focuses on 
the stages of changes in the relationship between verbal symbols in speech and 
thinking. All these works partly overlap and complement one another. 
Vygotsky’s writings show that he comes back to the same topics repeatedly, 
rephrasing, correcting, and (re-)developing them. Vygotsky explicitly distinguishes 
between signs and meanings in his writings as early as in 1924, already then 
focussing on the latter (Van der Veer, Valsiner 1991: 65), and he writes about signs 
in various published and unpublished papers; however, the core and all the main 
components of his approach to signs should emerge well in these four. 
As Vygotsky’s interests and views changed, and his health deteriorated in 
time, his writings are very heterogeneous. Thus, despite appearing as such in 
various secondary writings, Van der Veer and Valsiner (1991: 390) conclude 
that he could not come up with a fully developed system of thought; there is 
major fragmentation of ideas, a great deal of repetition, and a lack of cohesion. 
Overall, Vygotsky’s writings provide a complex of thought in which different ideas 
apparently overlap and complement one another only partly. 
The second problem already present in Vygotsky’s original works is how he 
himself presents and expresses his ideas in the current ideological, political, and 
1 Sometimes translated as “Tool and sign [in the development of the child]”, with only Vy-
gots ky given as the author, e.g. in Th e Collected Works of L. S. Vygotsky. Vol. 6: Scientifi c Legacy, 
edited by Robert Rieber (1999). It looks as if there is good reason to name Alexander Luria 
as the second author, cf. Van der Veer and Valsiner’s (1994: 170) notes. Apparently, the lost 
original was titled as “Orudie i znak” (Van der Veer, Yasnitsky 2016b: 171).
2 Partly compiled of writings from between the late 1920s and early 1930s.
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historical climate. Vygotsky was very well acquainted with and heavily influenced 
by his predecessors from the 1890s and early 1900s. He wrote in dialogue with 
and as a critique of many of his era’s major movements of research into child 
development, from behaviourism and reflexology to Gestalt psychology, of which 
only a few are mentioned in this paper. At the same time, the constant turmoil in 
Soviet society institutionally greatly affected and even threatened all academic 
endeavours. Vygotsky actively sought to include the views on science that were 
prevailing in Soviet society in his project. Van der Veer and Valsiner (1991) have 
given a chronological account of the development of Vygotsky’s ideas in his 
writings, and Van der Veer and Yasnitsky (2016a) tell the very complicated story of 
the publication of his works3, which mostly did not take place during his lifetime. 
Apparently, of the writings that the present paper uses, two were not published 
in full until the 1990s, one comes from 1986, and only the first (i.e. Vygotsky 
1994[1929]) was published during his lifetime. 
Regarding Vygotsky’s approach and even his writings as sources, a topic often 
arising is the relationship between him and his collaborators. Among many others, 
Stetsenko (e.g. 2003, 2004) argues that there is no good reason to look at the other 
authors involved in the so-called cultural-historical school, that has become to 
be known by Vygotsky’s name, independent of one another, as for her they make 
up a genuine “Vygotsky-Leontiev-Luria school”, including a whole group of like-
minded researchers. Then again, other authors (e.g. Van der Veer, Valsiner 1991: 
183–184; Yasnitsky 2016) rather stress the dynamic relations between various 
collaborators and find less reason to necessarily include them in one circle, as has 
often been done after Vygotsky’s death. Be it as it may, Vygotsky’s writings indeed 
heavily depend on experimental and theoretical research conducted by his fellow 
collaborators and students, which is largely left out of this study. 
The paper at hand relies on the selected sources. A detailed overview of 
Vygotsky’s works available in English, and of the variety of major problems with 
these translations (and already with the Russian originals, on which they were 
based), is presented in a repeatedly expanded and republished review by Van der 
Veer and Yasnitsky (2016b). Translations of Vygotsky’s and his collaborators’ works 
have been particularly erroneous over the years, with significant changes, leave-
outs and add-ins, in comparison to the original drafts in Russian. This includes 
even indiscriminate editing together of fragments from originally different 
published and unpublished materials, as is the case, for example, with one of the 
perhaps best-known books attributed to him, Mind in Society (Vygotsky 1978).
3 Even the available publications in Russian are deeply fl awed as sources (cf. Van der Veer, 
Yasnitsky 2016a).
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In case of this irregular and problematic book, the present study has followed 
its contents to its more relevant sources regarding the topic of signs (Vygotsky 
1994[1929], 1997; Vygotsky, Luria 1994), but focuses less on many other topics, 
e.g. that of the zone of proximal development, which has received more attention 
in educationally oriented applications of semiotics before. 
There have been multiple English editions of Thought and Language, or more 
correctly, Thinking and Speech. While according to Van der Veer and Yasnitsky 
(2016b: 162–163), the 1986 edition used here is better than others so far, these 
authors still correctly judge that it is “abridged and as such unfit for genuine 
scientific study”. Thus, for its purposes of reconstructing a coherent approach to 
development and signs, the present paper still relies on translations thought of as 
partly unreliable. This puts any English-based researcher interested in engaging 
with Vygotsky’s approach in an awkward predicament, as it remains unclear to 
what extent discussions are limited by sources in regard of the authenticity of 
translations or even their originals, and claims about the approach known by 
Vygotsky’s name will therefore be restricted.
Yet in these selected sources, assumed to be better than the others, Vygotsky’s 
programme as a whole remains largely intact, as do the general sentiment and 
philosophical position. This conviction also underlies the premise of this discussion. 
The task that this paper takes up is not to give a historical account of the development 
of Vygotsky’s thought: in striving to provide a framework for semiotics for studying 
children’s acquisition of symbols, the task at hand is to review and organize the topic 
of signs in Vygotsky’s works. The governing principle of handling these sources is the 
organization of his approach to signs in such a way that their place in development 
would be understood in an integrative whole, even if the original writings themselves 
historically come from different stages of thought.
Signs, tools, and practical intelligence
Vygotsky explicitly centred on signs in his analyses of practical intelligence and 
problem solving in humans, in discussion of conclusions drawn from Wolfgang 
Köhler’s Intelligenzprüfungen an Menschenaffen (1917/1921)4 and Karl Bühler’s 
Abriss der geistigen Entwicklung des Kindes (1919/1929)5. The term ‘practical 
4 Originally published in 1917, but developed with this title as the 2nd edition, 1921, Berlin: 
Julius Springer. Translated into English as Th e Mentality of Apes (Köhler 1925[1921]).
5 Originally published in 1919, but developed as a summary of a broader work as the 5th 
edition published by Verlag von Quelle and Meyer in Leipzig in 1929 and translated into 
English as Th e Mental Development of the Child (Bühler 1930[1929]).
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intelligence’ is to be understood as the ability to use external means or aids in 
practical problem-solving tasks, of which the most important at the time of 
Vygotsky’s studies appeared to be tasks that included the use of tools.
In his classic experiments conducted on the island of Tenerife, Köhler observed 
systematic tool use by insight in captive chimpanzees – contrary to popular beliefs 
held at the time, which attributed tool use only to humans. However, Köhler 
(1925[1921]: 267, 305) maintained that in chimpanzees, speech to “designate 
or describe objects” (i.e. specifically referential speech) was completely missing. 
Subsequently, Karl Bühler studied small children’s practical intelligence, “i.e. the 
realization of mechanical connections and the invention of mechanical means 
for mechanical ends” (Bühler, K. 1930[1929]: 51), comparing it to the capabilities 
of Köhler’s chimpanzees, and found considerable similarities in both the 
expression of these capabilities, as well as their developmental timelines (Bühler, 
K. 1930[1929]: 48–49). 
Thus, Charlotte Bühler (1930[1927]: 91–92) observed the first simple appear-
ances of tool use in children at the seventh month of age along with systematic, 
coordinated movement and perception which aligns with great changes in the 
development of the brain and hands. It followed from there that the child’s system 
of activities – i.e. the methods and forms of behaviour (including intelligence in 
terms of practical activity), conditioned by the organs and organization of the 
whole – is determined at any stage of development both by the degree of organic 
development (i.e. the chronological age) and the degree of the child’s ability to use 
tools (Vygotsky 1997: 21). In children, these first appearances of use of external 
aids in practical activity, and the corresponding bodily changes take place before 
the appearance of speech. Consequently, both Karl Bühler (1930[1929]: 51) and 
Charlotte Bühler (1930[1927]: 92), deriving from Köhler’s study and their own 
findings, concluded that instrumental thinking precedes speech and develops 
“quite independently” (Bühler, K. 1930[1929]: 51) of it in later life as well.
However, having adopted this view, many psychologists had subsequently 
assumed (cf. Vygotsky, Luria 1994: 102–106) – because of its early appearance 
and the relative independence of early practical, instrumental thinking from 
language – that, essentially, tool use in humans remains the same over the course 
of the entire development of a human being. It was thought that there was thus no 
general qualitative difference between thinking in humans and other apes, except 
in speech and other specifically symbolic activity. Behavioural differences between 
species appeared to lie merely in the quantitative extent of the development in 
psychological functions (e.g. perception, attention, practical intelligence etc.). The 
human specific forms of practical activity, similar to other apes in young children, 
simply appeared to expand on forms basic and characteristic of all apes. 
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In brief, the development of practical intelligence in children, which at earlier 
stages manifests in non-verbal behaviour, was often related to “natural” forms 
of activity only (Vygotsky, Luria 1994: 108), that is, to biologically inherited and 
organically formed behaviour – independent of social activity with other people. 
Speech as a specific activity appearing at a later age did not seem to add anything 
to thinking in general, but was considered a parallel line next to practical activity 
in the environment.
For Vygotsky, these studies, focussing on isolated elementary functions similar 
in many species, did not help to explain what was behaviourally specifically human 
(Vygotsky, Luria 1994: 106). In comparing psychological functioning of different 
species with that of humans, often individual functions were observed separately, 
as if innate and ready-made, and reduced to their elementary components 
(Vygotsky 1997: 2). Psychological functions of humans, including practical 
intelligence, were studied out of their social contexts, their social and cultural 
environment where they naturally belonged (Vygotsky 1997: 9). If psychological 
functions were studied in isolation, indeed, only little difference between species, 
and little change over the course of life might be apparent.
Likewise, the psychologists who focused on “the origin and development of 
speech, and of all other symbolic action” (Vygotsky, Luria 1994: 107) neglected 
relations of practical activity to children’s symbolic processes. At the time, 
language was mostly taken to be a purely intellectual, abstract conceptual system. 
Development in speech among the rest of the conceptual activity was observed 
mainly in its referential function, and out of the context of its actual social use. 
Speech was not taken as an integral part of the development of the system of 
children’s activities as a whole, and speech as an activity was seen as isolated 
from practical operations with objects. Their accidental co-occurrence was seen 
as caused by external factors, and thus the relations between them remained 
unstudied from the point of view of speech, as well as from the point of view of 
the system of activities. 
Especially Jean Piaget in his Le langage et la pensée chez l’enfant (1923)6 and 
William Stern, perhaps the most important authors on the development of 
symbolic thought at the time, found that children come to realize “the relationship 
between signs and their meaning” (Vygotsky, Luria 1994: 107) spontaneously, on 
their own. For these authors, Vygotsky and Luria (1994: 107) argue, the use of 
signs in their referential function seemed to appear in children either as a result of 
a logical inference or as a sudden discovery – i.e. not as part of the development 
6 Originally published in 1923, Neuchatel, Paris: Delachaux and Nestle; translated into 
English as Language and Th ought of the Child (1959, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul).
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as a continuous (historical) process. In the approaches of these authors, children 
appeared to grow into thinking in socially shared word meanings on their own. 
The importance of language to individual development was ignored both as a 
mediator of thought from one generation over to another, and from peer to peer, 
as well as in how language influences cognitive processes reflectively.
In words,7 for example, psychologists broke up “the living union of sound 
and meaning …//… into two parts, [...] [which were] assumed to be together 
merely by mechanical associative connections” (Vygotsky 1986[1934]: 5) as if 
their mutual interrelation had no effect on the broader behaviour within the sur-
rounding social and physical environment. Word meanings were as if living in a 
universe of pure ideas, free from both thinking and practical activity, e.g. talking 
itself. Speech was recognized as a communicative phenomenon (for exchanging 
messages), yet as nothing that would actually influence the thinking of its users, 
as the mechanism that connected speech with the rest of the practical activities 
appeared external to it. From the point of view of cognitive processes, words were 
taken as mere labels of experiences, an independent faculty, irrelevant to thinking 
in the individual. In laboratories, practical intelligence was isolated from speech 
and their interrelations were left unobserved, even if speech actually accompanied 
problem solving during experiments. As practical problem solving was assumed to 
be exclusively individual, social activity as a significant factor in the development 
of thinking was simply ignored. 
However, while there are small differences in the physiological and the basic 
elementary psychological functions of humans and their closest evolutionary 
relatives, there is a radical difference in their behaviour and activities (Vygotsky 
1997: 17). If the overall behavioural changes remain unaffected by the adoption 
of speech and the symbolic behaviour, the vast differences between practical 
activities of humans and other apes, as they occur in their natural habitats, outside 
the confined conditions of laboratories, in which experimentally isolated problem 
solving tasks were conducted, could not be explained.
In Vygotsky’s predecessors’ studies it remained unclear how such small diffe-
rences in the practical activities of humans and other apes and the systems of 
activity in their early development end up as such great differences in their later 
development – even more so if speech itself was, as it should have been, included 
in the system of activities (Vygotsky 1997: 37). If practical intelligence and the 
system of activities indeed remained untouched by the acquisition of the specific 
7 In Russian, the word ‘slovo’ may designate both ‘word’ and ‘speech’ (in Russian, also ‘rech’, 
which can also be used for words), and Vygotsky analyses both individual words and speech, 
sometimes alternately.
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domain of speech, the root of these differences in behaviour and activity were left 
entirely obscure.
Further, adopting this view would also make it impossible to explain how 
speech and other human-specific symbolic forms of behaviour would ever emerge 
in the first place, both from a phylogenetic and an ontogenetic point of view. It 
would remain unclear, how symbolic behaviour develops outside the system of 
activities, while these behaviours seem to play an essential part in the evolution of 
Homo sapiens as a species.
Finally, questions as to what psychological processes underlie different social 
and cultural activities, specifically characteristic of human societies, and vice 
versa, what effects those activities have on psychological functioning of individual 
human beings, remained unanswered. In this view, the entire cultural sphere 
appeared isolated from individual engagement.
The natural history of signs
Vygotsky and Luria (1994: 108) argue that if practical problem solving and 
communication appear isolated in apes, as Köhler’s observations seemed to show, 
then in the development of children practical activity and speech, two initially 
independent lines, develop in close integration and “the unity of these two systems 
is [...] specific to the complex behaviour” of humans. 
From the cognitive point of view, Vygotsky’s predecessors missed that in social 
interaction, the child’s entire behaviour, the system of activities, including tool 
use, problem solving and communication is transformed onto a higher level of 
organization with the aid and mediation of speech and, more broadly, symbols.
Vygotsky seems to have had no problem with the idea of the evolution of 
humans from other animals as a gradual process, but the differences, in his 
view, lied not only in degree but, as the result of the transmission and mastery of 
products of culture, also in kind (Van der Veer, Valsiner 1991: 193). No doubt the 
differences in the behaviours of humans and other apes must also be rooted in the 
biologically inherited factors, e.g. the phylogenetic and ontogenetic differences in 
the brain, but the differences between their actual cognitive capabilities become 
striking in the context of their activities within the surrounding environment. 
While neural conditions are necessary, they are not sufficient to explain human-
specific meaning making.
Although there appear no new elementary psychological functions in Homo 
sapiens compared to other species, these functions develop differently. For 
Vygotsky, the behavioural differences between species should not be attributed to 
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simple addition of speech only, as if it was some kind of a parallel faculty among 
other psychological functions. It is not so much the intricate differentiation of 
interpersonal communication that sets human behaviour apart from other species, 
but the organization of the behaviour as a whole, which it brings along. He argued 
that psychological functions should not be studied only individually, but in 
their interrelations, within the system in which they operate. The behavioural 
differences should be rooted in what makes such reorganization of the whole unity 
of practical activity possible. 
Vygotsky argued that when analysing the relationship between thinking and 
speech, both social and intellectual functions of language have to be taken into 
account, whereas the latter was often neglected. Language serves a double function: 
it is a means for social coordination of actions of people, useful for communicative 
purposes – and it is a tool for thinking, a means for organizing one’s own behaviour, 
similarly to the way it is used to organize the behaviour of others.
Vygotsky (1986[1934]: 6) claimed that it is in the internal aspect of the word, 
the word meaning, in which thinking and speech are linked into verbal thinking. It 
is precisely on the level of word meanings that the unity of behaviour and thinking 
is most apparent, as the unity of the physical stimulus and the word meaning tied 
to it relates the social and the individual, and the communicative and organizing 
functions of language. 
He argues that the advantage of words over concrete experience as symbolically 
unorganized thought is that they do not refer to any specific experiences, to single 
objects, but to classes of objects, generalized reflections of experience, abstractions 
(Vygotsky 1986[1934]: 6). In his view, the act of generalization is a verbal act of 
thought. This does not at all mean that after acquisition of speech, speech and 
thinking are the same, nor that all thinking becomes verbal or symbolic, as 
specified below in the analyses of development of concepts.
Initially, speech constitutes a part of the social environment of the child, 
fulfilling a communicative purpose, but during development it comes to organize 
individual activity itself, as it acquires an “intellectual” function. The acquisition 
of sign systems constitutes a change in thinking itself. In time, speech as a social 
activity becomes to be utilized for individual purposes. Symbolic activity, which 
emerges in this process as a higher level of organization, entails the unity of 
psychological functions. 
Vygotsky and Luria (1994: 109) argue that for the child, speech is “inalienable 
and internally necessary part of the operation, [...] as important as that of action 
in the attainment of a goal. Speech and action are one and the same complex 
psychological function, directed toward the solution of the given problem”. The 
more complex the action demanded by the situation and the less direct its solution, 
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the greater the importance played by speech in the operation as a whole. Vygotsky 
and Luria (1994: 109) explain that children solve practical tasks with speech as 
they use eyes and hands. Children act and speak for a purpose – the use of symbols 
as an activity is practically useful, because it organizes the solution of practical 
problems in the same way as coordinated movement and guided attention. In that 
sense, for Vygotsky, in verbal thinking, words are analogous to tools.
As the child learns to “master” the surrounding environment with the help of 
speech, the child’s own behaviour is reorganized as well, and thus new relations 
with the environment are formed (Vygotsky, Luria 1994: 109). Human beings 
characteristically grow up among other humans in the cultural environment. In 
humans, in fact, cultural development is normal development (Vygotsky 1997: 
175). Historical development in communicative means and other artefacts 
compensates individual development – e.g. once invented, the numeral ‘0’ does 
not have to be invented by each new generation again. Culture itself is adapted to 
the normal typical human being, while certain organic structures have developed 
to serve precisely as prerequisites of cultural development (Vygotsky 1997: 24). 
Thus, the adult thinking includes cultural forms of behaviour as well as “natural” 
ones, also in case of cultural isolation. The acquisition of speech and the cultural 
signification of the surrounding environment makes it possible to engage percep-
tion and movement for the purposes of the symbolic activity.
Vygotsky (1994[1929]: 57) explained that in human development the line of 
natural development of behaviour, “closely bound up with the processes of general 
organic growth and [...] maturation”, and that the line of “cultural improvement of 
psychological functions”, “methods of reasoning” and “behaviour” are intertwined.
From the point of view of ontogenesis, the natural and the cultural lines of 
develop ment form a single, although complex process: 
Both processes represented in separate forms in phylogenesis and combined with 
respect to continuity and succession are presented in a merged form and actually 
form a single process in ontogenesis. (Vygotsky 1997: 19) 
In this single process, as Vygotsky and Luria (1994: 148) describe it, the “natural” 
and the “cultural” lines are interweaved in such a way that a succession of 
develop mental stages is formed. Psychological functions such as (among others) 
perception, attention, memory, volition, concept formation and, of course, 
problem solving in practical intelligence, and even early communication, similar 
in chimpanzees observed by Köhler – the “lower functions” with “natural” roots – 
begin to form as the primary and the earlier stage of development. 
However, “mastering external materials of cultural development and thinking” 
(Vygotsky 1997: 10) such as for example language, writing, arithmetic – arise as 
268 Lauri Linask
the secondary stage as means of control and mediation of the “lower” functions. 
These “higher functions” are the result of inclusion of “symbolic forms of activity” 
(Vygotsky, Luria 1994: 136) in the lower functions. The higher functions, rising as 
specific new forms, as new structural entities (Vygotsky, Luria 1994: 142) form a 
psychological system that is essentially a new stage of development to the system 
of lower functions. 
Since various psychological functions are not isolated, but interrelated already 
at their early development, the formation of higher psychological functions also 
reorganizes the lower functions and their interrelations on a higher level:
[…] the higher functions of perception, memory, attention, movement and so on, 
prove to be internally connected with the development of the sign using activity 
of the child, and their comprehension is possible only on the basis of an analysis of 
their genetic roots and of that reconstruction which they underwent in the course 
of their cultural history. (Vygotsky, Luria 1994: 136)
While for Vygotsky language is the prototype among the higher, mediated systems, 
he also discusses on various occasions gestures, number systems, drawing, dia-
grams, maps, throwing dice and many other examples of symbols or symbol 
systems of social origin, more or less dependent on conventions at least at some 
stage of their use.
Their use or inclusion within behaviour itself is a result of a historical process 
with its own laws, which arises by way of development (Vygotsky, Luria 1994: 
148–151; Vygotsky 1994[1929]: 62) – “the natural history of sign operations”:
sign operations appear as a result of [...] complex and prolonged process that 
refl ects all the typical features of real development and is subject to all the basic 
laws of psychological evolution. Th is means that they are not simply invented or 
passed down by adults, but rather arise from something that is originally not a sign 
operation and that becomes one only aft er a series of qualitative transformations, 
each of which conditions the next stage and is itself conditioned by the preceding 
one and thus links them like stages of an integral process, historical in nature. In 
this respect the higher psychological functions are no exception to the general 
rule and do not diff er from other elementary processes. Th ey, too, are subject to 
the fundamental law of development which knowns no exceptions. Th ey appear 
in the child’s general process of psychological development not as something 
introduced from without or from within, but as the natural result of this same 
process. (Vygotsky, Luria 1994: 147, original emphasis)
The natural history of sign operation thus consists of (Vygotsky 1994[1929]: 63; 
Vygotsky, Luria 1994: 138–141): convergence of certain internal and external 
factors (e.g. mastery of any cultural method is only possible at a certain level 
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of internal development); “a determining influence” of the environment to ac-
complish this development; and transformation, not accumulation of expe rience, 
as the relationship between the two factors is “materially changed” (Vygotsky 
1994[1929]: 63). In this transformation, what emerges is “a higher order, deter-
mined mainly by the particular combination of a series of more elementary 
functions into a new whole” (Vygotsky, Luria 1994: 140). Finally, in case of 
pathological disintegration of higher psychological functions (e.g. in aphasia), and 
the degeneration of signs, the link between the symbolic and the natural functions 
is destroyed, and speech starts functioning as a more or less independent structure 
as before (Vygotsky, Luria 1994: 141). Disintegration of higher functions thus 
proceeds by the reverse of their formation.
This historicity in development entails, for example, that at one point the 
child acquires language, at another, with the aid of the first, the numeral system. 
While language, found in all cultures, brings at least to a certain extent common 
characteristics to the thinking of all people of all cultures, other sign systems bring 
certain specific characteristics to psychological operations depending on the way 
in which they function.
It is important to note that the division of the natural and the cultural lines of 
development, as well as lower and higher psychological functions are not dualisms 
of body and mind, but explicitly (e.g. Vygotsky, Luria 1994: 163) set as such to 
overcome this dualism by showing in which way the two often treated as apart 
are merged in the development of the system of the human behaviour as a whole. 
In Vygotsky’s writings, natural and cultural lines appear as opposed to each other 
in ways characteristic of his era, which took culture as something that rules or 
masters over nature. In Vygotsky’s writings, culture is essentially taken as a part of 
nature, but not (always) as far as terms are concerned.
From the point of view of language acquisition or development of symbols 
broadly, incorporating symbols among psychological functions is not a result 
of accumulation of habits, nor training or repetition, nor are signs invented or 
discovered, and the development of sign operations does not proceed along purely 
deductive lines as a pure logical operation (Vygotsky, Luria 1994: 115, 137). The 
metaphysical view that holds that internal psychological schemata are somehow 
available before interactions within the environment can only lead to supposing 
that higher psychological functions are somehow available a priori. Vygotsky found, 
on the contrary, that symbols and speech are not ready-made from the start, “but 
form[ed] [...] in the same way as walking supplants creeping and speaking baby talk, 
and not because the child becomes convinced of the advantage of the one over the 
other” (Vygotsky, Luria 1994: 115). It entails a qualitative structural change in the 
behaviour.
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At the same time, the use of signs in children shows its dependence on social 
means. Words and their meanings depend on both individual activity and their 
social use and the organic growth in symbolic thinking has both individual and 
social aspects. Not only is use of speech and other symbols a social activity, and 
their acquisition a result of social activity, they bring a social component to the 
entire behaviour.
Thus, Vygotsky provides the theoretical framework and outline for studying 
how symbols are taken into practical use and the entire system of activities is 
transformed. The task for observation is to find out whether and in which way 
acquisition of symbols and converging lines of development change psychological 
functions; in which way different cognitive functions relate to one another in 
this process; and how those psychological functions that depend on culture and 
historical development depend on the forms of thinking that are similar in many 
species besides humans.
The concept of signs
The cultural development of the child is essentially the natural history of signs, 
in which cultural forms of behaviour have natural roots in natural forms “tied 
to them by a thousand threads” (Vygotsky 1997: 94). Vygotsky (1997: 93, 104) 
distinguishes altogether three (sometimes four) stages in the child’s cultural 
development, “sequentially replacing each other and arising one from another”:
Instinct, or the innate, inherited resources of methods of behaviour, forms the 
fi rst stage. Above this rises the second stage, which might be called the stage of 
training, [...] or, in other words, the stage of habits or conditioned refl exes, that 
is, those learned and acquired through the personal experience of conditioned 
reactions. And, fi nally, the third stage rises still higher, the stage of the intellect 
or intellectual reactions that fulfi l the function of adaptation to new conditions 
and represent [...] an organized hierarchy of habits directed toward solving new 
problems. (Vygotsky 1997: 101)
In principle, all psychological functions – memory, attention, volition, concept 
forma tion etc. go through the same stages of cultural development, once they 
become structured by language and other symbols and symbol systems, which 
provide the mediating link between earlier and later stages of development.
Characteristically of the 1920s, Vygotsky conceptualized the foundations of his 
approach to cultural behaviour in terms of behaviourism, or reflexology, as one 
of its version was called in the Soviet Union. The idea was that every elementary 
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form of behaviour includes a direct reaction to a stimulus. A situation (or the task 
that the organism has at hand) is a stimulus for a (memorized) behaviour, and 
the reaction the established response (S→R), the relationship between the two an 
“associative or conditional reflexive connection” (Vygotsky 1994[1929]: 60). 
A sign operation (Vygotsky 1994[1929]: 60; Vygotsky, Luria 1994: 147; 
Vygotsky 1997: 54) brings into this elementary behaviour an intermediate link, 
which can be a word, but also any other kind of (external) auxiliary aid, X, a 
secondary stimulus between S and R, which Vygotsky then calls ‘sign’ (which itself 
is subsequently subject to development, as shown below). Instead of one, two other 
connections are established that lead to the same result, but in different ways:
Each of the connections taken separately is the same conditioned-refl ex process 
of closure in the cerebral cortex as the direct associative connection. New is the 
fact that one connection is replaced by two others; new is the construction or 
combination of nerve connections; new is the direction of the specifi c process of 
closure of the connection with a sign; what is new are not the elements, but the 
structure of the whole process of the reaction. [...] Analysis shows that the lower 
form is the basis and content of the higher form, that the higher form appears only 
at a certain stage of development and in turn itself continuously passes into the 
lower form. (Vygotsky 1997: 81)
Figure 1. The model of sign operation (adapted from Vygotsky 1994[1929]: 61; Vygotsky, 
Luria 1994: 144). S – stimulus; R – reaction; X – secondary stimulus, sign; SR – associative 
connection.
This secondary stimulus is actively included in the operation, where it begins to 
fulfil “as means” for the specific function of “serving its organisation” (Vygotsky, 
Luria 1994: 145) and creates a new relationship between S and R. When bringing 
in this intermediate link, the direct impulse is inhibited, and the operation is acted 
indirectly. Different means, e.g. different signs provide different structure for 
the operation – as memorizing with the help of writing differs structurally from 




In terms of the environment, both the original stimulus (S) and the sign (X) 
function in the same way, all the component parts of the sign operation being 
conditioned reflexes  – it is only that the sign functions in relation to S as well, 
including both itself and the original stimulus within the behaviour in which it is 
acted (e.g. the sign brings the original stimulus to the mind). The organism actively 
brings into a behaviour an external stimulus – resulting in a controlled, regulated 
behaviour – an operation. The ability to control one’s own stimuli “brings about an 
organised adaptation to the situation” (Vygotsky, Luria 1994: 137).
For that difference, though, it is not just a two-stage model of a stimulus-response 
reaction. Although both the relationship between the new stimulus and the original 
stimulus, and the new stimulus and the reaction, is in essence the same (S→R), the 
sign is not just a transference of reaction from one connection to another, but when 
used, it actively changes the structure of the entire process as a whole, and also the 
individual relations of its aspects (S and R). Signs are thus means of “autostimulation” 
(Vygotsky 1997: 54; Vygotsky, Luria 1994: 111, 145, 153) and 
every conditioned stimulus created artifi cially [...] is a means of mastering 
behaviour – that of another or one’s own – is a sign. Two points are therefore 
essential for the concept of a sign: its origin and its function. (Vygotsky 1997: 54)
In this way, every cultural behaviour involves conditioned reflexes as “natural” 
psychological processes as its material, but cannot be reduced to them, as a higher 
“functional and structural unity” is formed (Vygotsky 1994[1929]: 61). Vygotsky 
(1994[1929]: 59; 1997: 107) even goes on to say that culture creates nothing new, 
it just modifies nature to suit its goals:
Th e only new features are the substitution of two connections for one, the 
construction or combination of nervous connections, and the direction given to 
this process of connection by means of a sign. (Vygotsky 1994[1929]: 60)
Active use of these external stimuli enables humans to control their behaviour 
from “without” (Vygotsky, Luria 1994: 145) by raising the entire operation to a 
higher organization, in which “the sign and methods of its use are the functional, 
determining whole or focus of the whole process” (Vygotsky 1997: 84). 
By controlling the connections in the brain by artificial stimuli, humans control 
their bodies (Vygotsky 1997: 55). While the child goes through substantial biological 
development, cultural development may not imply deep organic changes at all.
At first, the organism’s responses are determined by external stimuli. Both 
language and other aids are initially set from without the child, in the social and 
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physical environment, inseparable of the activity as other stimuli, and only as a result 
of transformations do they become fully internalized mental forms. Maturation 
of the organism provides conditions for the use, but the environment provides 
motives and means, the artificial sign systems – and in the case of symbols, it is the 
environment of sociocultural meanings. In that sense, individual development is also 
socio-culturally determined. The process of development itself, however, 
[...] always originates inwardly, although it is modelled by the deciding infl uence of 
external problems with which the child is faced and the external signs with which 
it operates. Aft er the structure comes into being, it does not remain unchanged, 
but is subject to a lengthy change. (Vygotsky 1994[1929]: 62)
In several places, Vygotsky (e.g. 1997: 104–105) used the famous example of a 
pointing finger to illustrate the development of a sign. At first, for the small child, 
the pointing gesture is a simple unsuccessful grasping movement directed toward 
a desired object. If the object is a little too far away, the hand is left stretched out in 
the air, fingers set towards the object. When the mother comes to help, recognizing 
an attempt at grasping in the stretched-out hand, the entire situation changes. The 
pointing movement becomes a gesture for another person. It is not the object that 
provides a response, but another person, who carries out the attempt by handing 
the object. And only by that new situation as a whole the movement of grasping 
becomes the sign of direction for the child. Both the function and the appearance 
of the movement change: it is no longer directed towards the object, but to another 
person. When grasping movement is adopted for communication purposes, its 
external appearance is simplified, contracted, and differentiated from among other 
movements with the purpose of handling objects as an independent gesture of 
direction, no longer only for another, but also for oneself. In this process, the 
movement develops into a new sign, and interpersonal communication is turned 
intrapersonal. Thus, Vygotsky repeats the general law already given by Pierre Janet:
[…] every function in the cultural development of the child appears on the stage 
twice, in two planes, fi rst, the social, then the psychological, fi rst between people 
as an intermental category, then within the child as a intramental category. Th is 
pertains equally to voluntary attention, to logical memory, to the formation of 
concepts, and to the development of will. We are justifi ed in considering the thesis 
presented as a law, but it is understood that the transition from outside inward 
transforms the process itself, changes its structure and functions. (Vygotsky 1997: 
106)
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Thus, the development of higher psychological functions is by its very nature “a 
part of the history of the social formation of the child’s personality” (Vygotsky, 
Luria 1994: 138):
Th e sign primarily appears in the child’s behaviour as a means of social relations, 
as an inter-psychological function. Becoming aft erward a means by which the 
child controls its behaviour, the sign simply transfers the social attitude toward 
the subject within the personality. Th e most important and basic of genetic laws, 
to which the study of the higher psychological functions leads us, reads that 
every symbolic activity of the child was once a social form of co-operation and 
preserves through-out its development, to its highest point, the social method of 
its functioning. Th e history of the higher psychological functions is disclosed here 
as the history of the transformation of means of social behaviour into means of 
individual psychological organization. (Vygotsky, Luria 1994: 138)
In the development of sign operations, several further changes are possible, 
including regression to simple sensory-motor behaviours on the elementary level, 
the degeneration of signs, if the auxiliary stimulus is no longer necessary, becomes 
excluded, and the connection between a stimulus and a response becomes direct 
again. Also, although an operation may include an aid in the construction of an 
internal behaviour, after a period of repetitions of the operation, it might still lose 
its specific psychological function and thus the operation may lose its integral 
unity, so that it simply takes place in two sequential stages, and the aid becomes 
fossilized.
Signs as tools
Vygotsky is often cited (e.g. in the context of semiotic theory, Nöth 2009) for 
adopting the view that signs are similar to tools – especially based on his earlier 
writings (in this paper, e.g. Vygotsky 1994[1929]). While tools are used to 
change something in the external situation, signs as psychological tools, tools for 
thinking, directed inward, are used to change something in the mind of the person 
(Vygotsky 1997: 62, 89). Vygotsky adopted the metaphor to set speech within the 
context of activity as practically useful, not merely an abstract system of relations 
external or parallel to other psychological processes. Signs are similar to tools 
in practical activity because, from the point of view of instrumental thinking, 
they can be invented and used for solving a (practical) problem (e.g. Vygotsky 
1994[1929]: 69).
He sometimes differentiates between two classes of stimuli  – stimuli means 
and stimuli objects. Structurally, higher functions are a result of separation or 
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differentiation in the primitive whole of the stimulus-sign and stimulus-object 
(Vygotsky 1997: 85–86). When combined, they make up instrumental acts. In 
some sense, there is an analogy between signs and tools in the early period of the 
child’s practical intelligence when speech is similar to other external aids in the 
surrounding environment. At a certain developmental point (e.g. the instrumental 
period, when the sound of the word becomes to be used for something), the use 
of signs as external aids for solving psychological problems can be quite close to 
tool use – e.g. speech at its early stages as used as an instruction or a command 
(which is also the reason why it develops to subordinate motor reaction), as in the 
finger pointing example. Vygotsky initially used the term ‘priem’ (‘device’, ‘means’, 
‘method’), which he borrowed from the formalist Shklovskij, for instrumental, 
cultural acts (Van der Veer; Valsiner 1991: 218). The uniqueness of instrumental acts 
lies in their structure: both use of tools and use of signs as activities are “mediated 
activities” (Vygotsky 1997: 62) in terms of their relationships to their environments. 
In that sense, Vygotsky speaks about the instrumental function of signs.
However, Vygotsky (1997: 62, 89) uses the same metaphor to argue for the 
difference between tools and signs as devices by their origin and function:
Th us, a tool directed outward and a sign directed inward fulfi l technically diff erent 
mental functions. Depending on this, the very character of the detours diff ers in 
an essential way. In the fi rst case, we have certain objective detours consisting 
of material bodies; in the second case, detours of mental operations. Th ese 
circumstances simultaneously indicate similarities and diff erences between the 
structures we are considering and the structures of detours. (Vygotsky 1997: 89)
While both signs and tools are artificial devices, using the tool in the external 
environment involves a material effect on the tool, and then, by tool, on the object, 
whereas “sign changes nothing in the object itself, it only gives a new direction 
or reconstructs the mental operation” (Vygotsky 1997: 89). Words, for example, 
a distinct class of stimuli, become part of operations during the development of 
practical intelligence as social activity between people, substituting tools (e.g. 
sound), because they provide applicability to objects that are absent from the 
immediate present of the situation. Speech enables the child to seek and prepare 
stimuli which can be applied in problem solving, planning for the future, and 
organizing thought – in fact, sharing thoughts with other people. Signs involve a 
higher organization, and by the inclusion of signs within the behaviour, practical 
activity with external objects is fundamentally reorganized as well. Children then 
master the external situation fully by first mastering and reorganizing their own 
behaviour. 
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For this reason, we must not anticipate fi nding much similarity to working 
tools in these devices that we call signs. Moreover, together with similar and 
common characteristics in one activity or another, we must ascertain the essential 
characteristics of the diff erence in a certain relation-contrast. (Vygotsky 1997: 60)
Vygotsky goes on to argue explicitly against carelessly adopting the metaphor of 
tools when writing about signs:
In this sense, based on the conventional, fi gurative meaning of the term, we 
usually speak of tools when we have in mind the mediating function of some 
object or means of some activity. True, such common expressions like “language 
is a tool of thinking,” “auxiliary devices of memory” (aides de memoire), “internal 
technique,” “technical auxiliary device” or simply auxiliary devices with respect to 
any psychological operation (Geistestechnik – “spiritual technique,” “intellectual 
tools,” and many others), are found in abundance among psychologists, are 
devoid of any specifi c content, and have scarcely any meaning beyond a simple 
metaphoric, picturesque expression of the fact that some objects or operations or 
others play an auxiliary role in the mental activity of man.
In addition, there is no shortage of attempts to ascribe a literal sense to similar 
signs, equating the sign and the tool, to erase the profound diff erence between the 
one and the other, to dissolve in general psychological determinations the specifi c 
distinctive characteristics of each type of activity. (Vygotsky 1997: 60–61)
The development of sign use is not only specific to practical intellect (the ability 
to use tools), as analogous development from “lower” to “higher” organization 
takes place in all other activities that were shaped organically at their earlier stages 
(Vygotsky, Luria 1994: 136). The laws of development of practical intellect, while 
involving a certain unity of psychological functions, are only a particular case of 
laws of development of all higher psychological functions.
While Vygotsky’s approach was more “instrumental” in the beginning, later 
he even appears to say that it is fundamentally misleading to compare words 
with ordinary objects (e.g. sticks used by Köhler’s chimpanzees), which could 
do nothing to explain (the development of) word-meanings as signification 
(1986[1934]: 215–216).
The development of speech and its relationship to 
other cognitive functions
As already explained, Vygotsky thought that if communicative speech and prac-
tical thinking (the two among other “lower” functions) start to develop inde-
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pendently, their convergence is the specific characteristic of Homo sapiens, once 
communicative speech is turned to organize the behaviour of the individual 
him- or herself as it is used with others, first externally and then internally. Once 
speech and other psychological functions are intertwined, the lower functions are 
reorganized on a higher level, while the way in which lower functions operate 
changes as well. Vygotsky believed that human behaviour is layered similarly to 
the earth’s crust, in which the lower levels are the material for the higher (Vygotsky 
1997: 101; Vygotsky, Luria 1994: 131). To explain this convergence, it is helpful 
to look briefly at how Vygotsky (cf. 1997: 118–122, 244–245) sees the basic 
development of speech and other communicative activities (as from a “lower” to 
a “higher” psychological function).
At first, the child’s vocal behaviour, e.g. crying, takes place purely externally, 
and as a reflex. Once it develops into a conditioned response, it takes place not to 
any specific signal, but to the situation as a whole – to a number of signals that 
make up the complex situation and that have something in common – e.g. they 
occur together. If one of the signals occurs more frequently, the reaction begins 
to differentiate and, slowly, the reaction begins to correspond only to a selected 
stimulus. The reaction itself does not develop in isolation, but within an organic 
group of reactions – there is no single vocal reaction, but a series of movements 
among which the vocal reaction is just one.
As the vocal response is connected with a certain external impression, an 
independent reaction gradually develops from within the whole. Because in 
communicative situations the vocalization turns central, and other corresponding 
movements are eliminated one by one, the vocal reaction itself starts to develop, 
putting the rest of the complex of reactions in the background. While the earliest 
reactions are “emotional”, once the vocal reactions become conditioned, and 
vocalizations become functional, the reaction becomes to serve “social contact” – 
which thus becomes the response for the vocalizations of people around the child 
around at one month (Vygotsky 1997: 122). Speech as a means of social contact 
becomes the starting point of all subsequent cultural development, as “initially, 
the sign is always a means of social connection, a means of affecting others, and 
only later does it become a means of affecting oneself ” (Vygotsky 1997: 103). At a 
certain point of development, adults begin to instruct the child8.
Subsequently, at six months, the child vocalizes to call attention and responds 
to adults’ words with specific movements, at nine months the child calls attention 
8 Indeed, as Van der Veer and Valsiner (1991: 226) have found, Vygotsky and Luria used 
the ‘scaff olding’ metaphor in this context (anticipating Bruner’s later work) in 1930, Etyudy 
po istorii povedeniya. Obez’yana. Primitiv. Rebenok. (Moscow, Leningrad: Gosudarstvennoe 
Izdatel’stvo, page 202.)
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with tugging clothing, and at ten months shows an object to an adult demonstra-
tively (cf. Vygotsky 1997: 245). One of the more important aspects of this develop-
ment of speech is its relation to thinking.
Vygotsky believes that originally, linguistic meaning, and thus also symbols 
develop from “gestures” (Vygotsky 1997: 248) as external (vocal, manual etc.) 
behaviour, as already illustrated by the finger pointing example. Vygotsky thinks 
that the first words “serve not an affective expressive function, but an indicating 
function. They replace or accompany the pointing gesture” (Vygotsky 1997: 
248). Therefore, it appears that for Vygotsky, the development of indicative (i.e. 
referential) signs from among other (e.g. emotional, instructional) single-word 
constructions (i.e. holophrases) denotes the differentiation of the semantic aspect 
of the word, and therefore is the beginning of intellectualization of speech9:
Speech and the meaning of words develop naturally, and the history of how the 
meaning of a word developed psychologically helps to cast light to a certain degree 
on how signs develop, how the fi rst sign appears naturally in a child, how mastery 
of the mechanism of signifi cation occurs on the basis of a conditioned refl ex, how 
from this mechanism a new phenomenon arises that extends as if beyond the 
boundaries of the conditioned refl ex. (Vygotsky 1997: 126)
In this development, initially, what is sometimes called ‘sign-carrier’ – speech as 
external behaviour – acquires a relationship no longer with a specific external 
object hic et nunc, but with what is formed as a generalized idea.
Indicating which sets abstraction into motion is also, in our opinion, a psycho-
logical model of the fi rst assigning of a certain meaning to a sign, in other words, 
it is a model of the fi rst formation of a sign. (Vygotsky 1997: 171)
Vygotsky (1997: 126) suggests that what the child initially masters is “the external 
structure of the meaning of words” – that each thing has a name, and that the 
thing and the name are structurally united in the context of their use. This is 
evidenced in that for small children, “the word standing for the thing becomes as 
if the property of the thing itself ” (Vygotsky 1997: 126), and that at early stages, 
children idiosyncratically extend words to mean all (locally, functionally etc.) 
9 Caution is advised here, because at a diff erent place, Vygotsky (1986[1934]: 218-219) also 
claims somewhat surprisingly that while thinking develops with the help of speech from wholes 
to parts, speech develops from parts (words) to wholes (phrases), in essence diff erentiating 
between psychological and linguistic (grammatical) propositions. If that were indeed the case, 
this claim here would only apply to linguistic development, to be exact – to the development of 
“linguistic meaning”.
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contiguous or similar objects of their contextual co-occurrence, before their word 
meanings – what they take words to stand for – are gradually set at conventional 
meanings (a process to be more closely analysed below10):
Precisely as in the development of our speech, words do not arise arbitrarily, but 
always arise in the form of a natural sign connected with some image or with 
some operation, and in children’s speech, signs do not appear from what the child 
himself invents; the child obtains signs from those around him and only later 
realizes or discovers the functions of these signs. (Vygotsky 1997: 128)
For Vygotsky (1997: 134–135, 1986[1934]: 102), things, including words, become 
signs functionally. Even if a small child recognizes the similarity between the 
drawing and an object, the child takes the drawing to be a similar object, “not as 
a representation or symbol” (Vygotsky 1997: 140). First, the word and the object 
share an actual context of their use, and only later that real connection between 
the spoken word and its object is broken (Vygotsky 1997: 130). This way, speech 
develops as any other conditioned reflex and, in this sense, speech initially occurs 
“independently” of thinking. At first, the child masters the connection between 
the word and the object or the thing as a simple contact between two stimuli, 
rather than the relationship between the “sign and meaning” (Vygotsky 1997: 
130). Slowly, the seams between the spoken word and the particular object are 
lost in favour of the word meaning as a socially shared generalized concept. The 
development of these concepts will be discussed below.
This point, though, is just the beginning of the development of symbolic 
thinking as a distinct, developmentally differentiated internal structure. The main 
interest, for Vygotsky, is the development of cultural forms of meaning making in 
relation to natural and practical forms of thinking.
Changes in perception accompanying symbol acquisition
Language acquisition and symbol use more broadly brings great qualitative 
changes to cognitive processes, but it is not so much individual psychological 
functions that change, but their organization in relation to each other. Already in 
their “natural” forms, it is not so much functions separately that are important, 
but how they work together, and how their relationships change in the complex 
whole. The relationship between practical intelligence and speech includes several 
10 Vygotsky’s idea of how word meanings develop in children’s speech was strongly inspired 
by how Alexander Potebnya saw the historical development of word meanings in languages.
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different psychological functions. Vygotsky discusses these changes in comparison 
and contrast to the cognitive abilities observed in chimpanzees by Köhler, whose 
findings Vygotsky accepted almost entirely (Van der Veer, Valsiner 1991: 203). The 
main difference between humans and chimpanzees lies in the use of symbols, that 
is, it is rooted in the way symbols cognitively reorganize psychological functions. 
Different psychological and symbolic functions and forms of representation 
(which are results of the acquisition and use of different sign systems) also 
develop at different paces. Thus, relationships between psychological functions 
significantly depend on the degree of their development.
On the visual field, elements are perceived all at the same time, thus it is 
“integral” compared to speech, which demands indication of elements, ordering 
and joining elements together into a sentence structure, and thereby “analytic” 
(Vygotsky, Luria 1994: 126). In the beginning, perception is integral, differentiating 
only in time. 
As already explained, the early speech of the child functions externally, within 
the situation, together with the object and other activities of the child. At the time, 
in order to deal with the object, the small child needs a whole set of additional 
bodily movements to compensate for the lack of verbal development. Asking the 
parent to pass him or her a toy, the child may use finger pointing even when 
knowing the name of the toy. According to Vygotsky, the function of the early 
words and movements within the situation as a whole is indication. 
In perception, indication with the help of signs enables the child to single out 
and distinguish concrete single objects from the situation as a whole (Vygotsky, 
Luria 1994: 125). Naming the toy enables the child to focus the situation for the 
parents. Using words, adults guide the attention of the child at some objects and 
not others. 
Words become centres of the perceptual structure  – adoption of words 
organizes the natural structure of the situation around their meanings:
[…] speech articulates its perception, singles out in the entire complex salient 
points of support, introduces an analytical factor into perception, and thus 
supplants the natural structure of apperception by a complex and psychologically 
indirect one. (Vygotsky, Luria 1994: 126)
Thus, perception is no longer only an observation of some shape or colour – it is 
not isolated, but categorized. In a way, humans perceive with the aid of speech.
With the help of symbols, the child can infer from the environment without 
having to resort only to his or her senses. After the acquisition of speech, 
operations of a child are characterized by radically greater freedom of behaviour 
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from the immediate present of the visual situation of the application of these 
operations. The child learns to prepare the solution of a problem – a complex set 
of preliminary acts with a long chain of auxiliary means – beforehand, in the field 
of speech, and only then realize it in the motor activity. Young children manipulate 
objects in their given field of vision, whereas the child’s symbolic operations 
become detached from this “natural” field. With the aid of speech, the child creates 
auxiliary stimuli standing between the child and the environment, acquiring a 
relative freedom from the situation at hand, the impulsive behaviours thus 
transformed into a planned, organized behaviour. Engaged in various activities, 
the child no longer has to follow the visual connection between his or her activity 
and its goal in the situation at hand and an activity may acquire a purpose or goal 
that is not visible in the concrete present. The child may include aids, indirect 
methods or means, bring along new additional stimuli (e.g. verbally, spelling out 
words) that are not present in the immediate perceptual field.
Other functions are no longer dependent on the structure of the perceptual 
field, nor on the perceptual apparatus – symbolic activity enables control over 
the perceptual field and guides the apparatus. It enables (planning of) tool use for 
solving practical problems outside of the direct sensory field.
Vygotsky and Luria observe that a two-year-old can perform and dramatize 
the meaning of a picture or a situation shown to him or her earlier than explain 
it verbally, the child at this point yet unable to generalize the meaning of the 
situation in its parts (Vygotsky, Luria 1994: 125; Vygotsky 1997: 193–194). At this 
early stage, the control of speech is insufficient to guide the attention purposefully 
from part to part, although the meaning of the picture is comprehensible to the 
child integrally, as a concrete experiential whole. Later, intellectual mechanisms 
related to speech no longer need words merely as indicators – speech becomes 
functionally “synthetic”, and the intertwining of words and the situation allows 
more nuanced articulation.
Changes in the process of selection during 
symbol acquisition
At first, the child’s selection takes place entirely in the sensory-motor sphere as 
analytically undifferentiated associative behavioural sequence. In categorization 
tasks, the child’s responses are entirely confined within the motor sphere  – 
with no preliminary plan of action, no internal operation (of thinking through 
the problem at hand) – and take place from among previously acquired motor 
behaviours as operations as wholes. Even once selection begins to rely on memory 
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(in the sense of previously acquired experience) – once conditioned, instead of 
being determined by the stimulus – it cannot differentiate within it (Vygotsky 
1997: 207). The child does not mark or signify the central feature or aspect from 
within the situation to coordinate the response accordingly. The child does not 
even start problem solving with observation of the situation as an adult might, but 
proceeds with an immediate response. Even when the child already speaks, i.e. can 
use words as means of communication, speech is not used for “thinking” through 
the selection (Vygotsky 1994[1929]: 59), e.g. analytically. The child selects directly 
the entire response that the moment calls for – the selection itself is the response – 
the movement corresponds to the perceptual situation at hand and series of trial 
movements substitute the actual selection, if the response fails (Vygotsky, Luria 
1994: 128–129).
Initially, the sensory and motor process form an integral unity in which various 
psychological functions are fused with one another within dynamic wholes in 
which they are psychologically undifferentiated. The same general structural 
relationship between sensory and motor processes is maintained also in cultural 
development at first, but in time, the primary structural connection is broken or 
discontinued: 
this primary natural relation between perception and movement, their inclusion 
in a common psycho-physical system, disintegrates in the process of cultural 
development, and is replaced by relations of quite diff erent structure, beginning 
from the moment when words or some other sign is introduced between the initial 
and concluding stages of the reactive process, and the entire operation assumes an 
indirect character. (Vygotsky, Luria 1994: 128–129)
At the beginning, the stimulus for the child’s behaviour, the concrete experience 
of an object (as its “reference”) dominates over the selection, but during the 
development of speech, the generalized meaning starts to dominate (as discussed 
in detail below). With the differentiation of sensory processes and their motor 
responses, the direct response is inhibited, and intellectual life as an independent 
psychological function emerges. When operations become acted internally, 
thinking as preliminary planning of external behaviour is differentiated from 
perceptual thinking.
Inclusion of symbols reconstructs the process of selection from an opposite 
direction, enabling construction of a preliminary plan to execute it accordingly by 
representing and keeping “in mind”, by bringing to the fore the relevant features 
and aspects, and reorganizing the situation at hand around them appropriately. 
The symbol is thus given a function as the decisive point in relation to the problem 
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at hand. Acquisition of symbol use has therefore an effect on the entire cognitive 
process of selection.
Signs make it possible to distinguish the construction of the problem from its 
sensory field and enable to differentiate a previously mastered operation into its 
analytical parts in relation to the problem. The child no longer approaches the 
problem impulsively, determined by the factors in the environment, but from the 
point of view of the purposefully selected aspect, chosen appropriately. Signs make 
up “a functional barrier” between the stimulus and the response by internally 
creating a relationship between the stimulus and the corresponding sign, the 
movement is detached from direct perception and taken under the control of 
“preliminary symbolic combinations” (Vygotsky, Luria 1994: 130–131).
The cultural development of attention
The organic base of attention develops according to changes in the broader 
organization of the behaviour: 
Initial attention occurs through hereditary nerve mechanisms that organize the 
refl ex processes according to the principle of the dominant that is familiar in 
physiology. Th is principle establishes that in the operation of the nervous system, 
the organizing point is a dominant focus of excitation that inhibits the process of 
other refl exes and is augmented at their expense. (Vygotsky 1997: 153)
At first, the child’s attention is entirely dependent on the properties of the external 
object on the perceptual field, and the child’s own interest in them. The cultural 
development of attention (and “its distraction”, Vygotsky, Luria 1994: 132) entails 
change in the means of control and the operation of attention, and bringing 
them under the control of the person’s will (Vygotsky 1997: 153). In other words, 
mastery of attention lies in mastery of external stimuli as devices. Volition itself 
lies in control of one’s own behaviour with overcoming stimulus-response cycles 
by inclusion of signs.
Speech begins to reconstruct the structure of the perceptual field, selecting 
certain aspects of the situation and not others, guiding the attention onto 
them, against their background. Thus, the early “indicative function of words” 
enables sign users to control their attention by creating corresponding centres 
of attention, guiding the attention independently of the actual present situation 
of the surrounding environment (Vygotsky, Luria 1994: 132). In attention, signs 
have a “pointing function” (Vygotsky 1997: 243). With the aid of symbols, children 
thus reorganize their visual spatial field, and from this point on, the perceptual 
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field (as a kind of a response on its own) no longer coincides with the attention. 
Voluntary attention therefore functions similarly to involuntary attention, but is 
guided independently of the perceptual field at hand. Vygotsky (1997: 161) argues 
that voluntary attention is mediated attention turned inward. Mastery of attention 
entails a substantial change in the relationship between the subject and the object, 
or put simply – a young child sees something, and turns attention to it, while an 
older child turns attention to see something.
The child’s attention becomes guided very early. First, the adults direct the 
child’s attention with words “creating as if additional pointers – arrows – to the 
things around the child”, but then the child begins to turn the attention of the adult 
by the same words, as instructions (Vygotsky 1997: 167–168). In social contact, 
these early words function as instructions or commands, while subsequently they 
come to indicate the corresponding object intellectually.
Th e word that signifi es the concept actually appears fi rst in the role of an indicator 
that isolates some traits of an object, calls attention to these traits, and only then 
does the word become a sign that represents these objects. Ach11 says that words 
are the means of directing attention so that in a series of objects that have the same 
name, common properties are identifi ed on the basis of the name which thus leads 
to the formation of a concept. (Vygotsky 1997: 172)
For Vygotsky, voluntary attention thus is a social phenomenon – the process of 
voluntary attention directed by language or speech is initially a process in which 
the child is relatively more likely to be dependent on the adult than to manage his 
own perception.
The development of cultural memory
In symbolic thinking, signs as stimuli substitute things, situations and other objects 
external to the situational present, e.g. by representing relevant past experiences 
in the active present of the situation of remembering. Symbols become means for 
remembering.
Vygotsky distinguishes between two basic types of memory – first, the un-
systematized, unmediated expression of experience, close to perception itself, with 
which it has not broken off immediate connection (Vygotsky 1994[1929]: 57) as an 
immediate impression of the material of the memory (Vygotsky, Luria 1994: 143). 
11 In his writings on the development of concepts, Vygotsky relied on the works by Narziß 
Ach. See below.
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As a physiological function, it is characteristic of the stage in which intellectual 
operations are not yet fully formed, part of the “natural” line of development, 
and does not involve cultural aids. By the time of Vygotsky’s writings, it was well-
known that “the plasticity of our nerve substance is expressed in its capacity to 
change under the influence of external actions and to preserve a predisposition 
toward their repetition” (Vygotsky 1997: 179).
The second type, the sociocultural memory, on the other hand, at least to 
some degree independent in its origin from the natural type, is determined by the 
cultural history, is passed down from generation to generation by sociocultural 
interaction, and includes in its organization symbolic signs. Vygotsky (1997: 187, 
189) claims that language itself is a “mnemotechnical tool” – functioning as a 
kind of an organization of memory by signs, and that writing as external system 
of symbols developed as auxiliary means for memorizing. In cultures, symbols 
are used to convey accumulated experience, while they are of course not the only 
means. In individual people, development of cultural memory involves rapid rise 
in the power and ability to memorize, which is the result of reorganization of 
memory, which is taken under active and voluntary control by cultural means 
(Vygotsky 1997: 184). Voluntary memory, as preliminary planning of action and 
cultural thinking in general, develops when external means of memorizing have 
become internal.
In the beginning, the sign only recalls a certain stimulus orderly paired with 
it, and the sign and the stimulus itself are not completely separated from each 
other. They form a syncretic structure involving both the sign and its object, and 
the symbol brought in to control the behaviour cannot be purposefully used as 
means of memorizing yet, as it is entirely dependent on the object, the original 
stimulus (Vygotsky, Luria 1994: 148). A reverse operation with the pair (e.g. 
using the object to recall the sign) is not possible and leads to formation of a 
completely novel (syncretic) association. In fact, according to Vygotsky and Luria 
(1994: 149), the child might even arrive by a series of associations carrying him 
or her step after step at the starting point. However, these are merely series of 
individual (syncretic) associations of signs one after another, whereas there still is 
no purposeful (instrumental) use of the sign in relation to the original stimulus. 
An auxiliary verbal structure cannot be made use of to support memorizing.
This early stage is followed by the next in which active intellectual recall 
becomes possible by perceptual similarity between the expression and content (the 
sign can be used as means of recall if it resembles the object), and the operation 
of recall becomes reversible at least to an extent (Vygotsky, Luria 1994: 150). This 
“intermediate stage” has its own laws of connections and relations, out of which 
the indirect relation fully develops only later. 
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From the stage of using symbols associatively, the development takes place in 
the further direction of differentiation, so that the need for a motivated relationship 
between the expression of the sign and the content is eventually lost. The sign 
operation is thus acted free of the constraints arising from the expression (in 
principle, any sign can be linked to any meaning), “reverse action” (Vygotsky, Luria 
1994: 143) becomes possible, but thinking is still acted externally, by external means.
It is not until adolescence that the symbols utilized for performing operations 
can become entirely independent of their particular expressions and external aids 
are substituted by inner stimuli (Vygotsky 1994[1929]: 65), and from “external-
instrumented operations”, the process becomes an “inner-reconstructed operation” 
(Vygotsky, Luria 1994: 152). Thus, the most characteristic of full development is 
when the child, after mastering the structure of the sign operation, constructs the 
internal processes according to the type, so that the same operation can be applied 
in all analogous situations, even if external conditions have changed radically.
In relation to the perception of time, mediated memory enables children to 
reorganize the temporal aspect of their surrounding visual space: symbols create 
the “field of time” (Vygotsky, Luria 1994: 132). Verbalized function of attention 
enables singling out and combining elements of the sensory field of both its past, 
present, and future states. In this way, past, present and future are purposefully 
joined together onto one field of attention in a linear line of successive events, 
e.g. as cause and consequence, or means to an end. Certain moments of the past 
are interpreted from the point of view of the present, using certain aspects of 
memories and not others for the purposes of setting up a potential future state of 
the sensory field. Hence, the unification of the past, the present, and the future of 
the perceptual field also entails new ways of organizing memory. In the process, 
memory in terms of a simple response is differentiated and forms an independent 
representation, and thus – what Vygotsky deems as “cultural memory” (Vygotsky 
1994[1929]: 60). Among many other phenomena, it is the underlying condition 
for why there is narrative construction of thought instead of a temporal extension 
of an operation by adding links or postponing responses, common to behaviour 
(of many species) also before the acquisition of speech.
Furthermore, the “symbolic form” of anticipated elements belonging to 
potential future states of the sensory field allows the inclusion of these elements 
in the organization of present activities (Vygotsky, Luria 1994: 134). This way, the 
motoric action is separated from the present sensory field:
[…] the actually perceived elements of the present situation are included in 
one structural system with symbolically represented elements of the future. An 
absolutely new psychological fi eld for action is created, leading to the appearance 
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of the function of formation of intention and previously planned purposeful action. 
(Vygotsky, Luria 1994: 134, emphasis in the original)
In interrelations between the symbolic functions, attention, and memory, in 
relation to the actual present context of the behaviour, the symbolic representation 
starts planning present activities for the purposes of reaching a future goal or aim. 
As the functional barrier between perception and motoric processes, instead of 
simple purposeful activity in the immediate context of the behaviour, the symbolic 
function enables free action and planning of future activities.
In summary, the older child remembers not only better, but differently  – 
the cultural development of memory entails organizing one’s behaviour “by 
means of a geographical map or by means of a plan, a scheme or a summary” 
(Vygotsky 1994[1929]: 58). All these mnemonic devices, which do not constitute 
memory directly, “carry out in the general structure of the new operation the 
function formerly fulfilled by direct retention” (Vygotsky, Luria 1994: 143). 
These incorporated artificial, self-generated signs and symbols as aids extend 
memory beyond the biological dimensions of the nervous system. In the process 
of their use, it is essential that they were external at a certain stage, and instead 
of having to rely on one’s natural capacities, they provide the recourse to external 
manipulations within their culturally shared contexts. For Vygotsky (1997: 50–51), 
affecting the memory of another person structurally takes place as affecting one’s 
own memory, which is the grounds for cultural transmission over generations with 
the aid of conventional signs.
Internalization of speech in the development of 
sign operations
As already discussed, every “higher psychological function” begins with social 
activity, and with “external means”:
In the beginning the sign, as a rule, is an external auxiliary stimulus, an external 
means of autostimulation. Th is is conditioned by two causes: fi rst, by the fact that 
the roots of this operation are found in the collective form of behaviour which 
always belong to the sphere of external activity, and, second, because of the 
primitive laws of the individual sphere of behaviour which, in their development, 
have not yet become separated from external activity, are not set apart from direct 
perception and external action (for instance, from practical thought in the child); 
yet the laws of primitive behaviour state that the child masters its external activity 
earlier and with less diffi  culty than inner processes. (Vygotsky, Luria 1994: 153)
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The transformation of inter-psychological operations into intra-psychological 
operations does not take place immediately, as it has to go through several external 
changes before it can be turned inwards definitely. In fact, while others gradually 
become internal, for many functions, the stage of external signs is the final one 
(Vygotsky, Luria 1994: 154). 
In this process of “internalization” or “interiorization” of cultural forms 
of behaviour, the reconstruction of psychological activity on the basis of sign 
operations, what was an outward process at first is transformed into an inward 
process, giving birth to a new psychological system:
On the one hand, the natural process undergoes radical reconstruction, being 
transformed into an indirect, instrumented act; and on the other hand, the sign 
operation itself changes, ceasing to be external and becoming transformed into the 
most complex inner psychological systems. (Vygotsky, Luria 1994: 155)
Internalization is the central process in which speech and practical activity are 
intertwined and leads to the control of one’s own behaviour, thus an aspect of what 
has already been covered from various points of view. In brief, internalization is 
simply reorganization of behaviour (including thinking) with the help of symbols. 
To the extent that any cultural behaviour includes symbols, the very process of 
this organization itself, integration of symbols within thinking essentially entails 
internalization. One of its results is a specific internal process of thinking, which 
includes means that were originally external and socially shared as its principle of 
organisation.
Vygotsky (e.g. in debate with Piaget, 1986[1934]: 15–40) observed the process of 
internalization in the development of speech. According to Vygotsky, internalization 
occurs when “egocentric speech”, speech for oneself, is gradually differentiated from 
social speech as it acquires an independent psychological function, and is eventually 
turned into “inner speech”, a speech completely independent and separated from 
social use for others, used for purely intellectual purposes. 
At earlier stages of “cultural development”, the communicative use of speech 
mostly entails children turning to their parents for help or assistance. Speech 
initially accompanies the child’s activities and increases in case of a need or a 
problem to be solved. In these situations, slowly, speech develops as means of 
reflection to describe and analyse the task or the problem at hand – often together 
with parents, peers and others, who provide the assistance. Speech enables 
bringing the process of thought reflectively on the thought itself.
The reflective and planning functions are closely related, the latter emerging 
from the former (Vygotsky, Luria 1994: 120) and in the structure of the situation, 
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speech progressively moves to the positions before it and its turning points, as 
planning becomes the distinct functional centre of the operation. In the beginning, 
the structure of the “verbal action” follows the structure of the problem at hand, 
action dominating over speech, but in time, the verbal structure starts to provide 
the mould for the operation, and speech acquires control (Vygotsky 1997: 201). 
The child both acts on and pays attention to what is present in the situation at 
hand, and plans the separate parts of the operation in words (Vygotsky 1997: 200). 
In an older child, reasoning with the help of words gets even stronger. Cognitive 
processes and practical intelligence become interdependent with speech as it 
becomes the instrument of the problem’s organized solution. As the social activity 
is transferred within the child, the same self-directed process starts to organize 
speech for the purposes of planning individual activity. Thus, two types of speech 
begin to differentiate – speech for others and speech for oneself.
At first, egocentric speech manifests audibly as children often talk to them-
selves, in play and especially during situations in which increased speech can 
provide structure for a solution of a problem (e.g. making a choice among pencils 
when the right colour is not available, as in Vygotsky 1986[1934]: 30). In the 
beginning, its appearance is very similar to speech for others, increasing in case 
of a need or a problem, and, in fact, only occurring in the presence of others 
because of its social roots, while its purpose or function is directed distinctly at the 
activity in process. The child actually seems to be under the impression of being 
understood by other children. However, in time, social and egocentric speech 
develop along separate lines progressively differentiating from each other. The 
more egocentric speech differentiates functionally, the more it comes to differ 
structurally. Although in the beginning, egocentric speech resembles social speech 
more, it slowly comes to resemble closely inner speech (Vygotsky 1986[1934]: 
226), which is different from egocentric speech in that it is completely silent and 
fully formed for individual use.
Vygotsky (1986[1934]: 182, 225, 242–243) suggested that inner speech, and 
more precisely all speech for the purposes of oneself – “an autonomous speech 
function”, a “distinct plane of verbal thought” (Vygotsky 1986[1934]: 248) – has 
its own particular structural characteristics related to the functional purposes it 
served. It has a special condensed and abbreviated, highly elliptical syntax with a 
tendency towards predicativity with subject of the utterance omitted (as there is 
no need to tell oneself the subject of the talk). It is full of idioms and words used in 
idiosyncratic meanings incomprehensible to others. It is the structural opposite of 
writing, in which everything needs to be explained fully in order to be intelligible 
(Vygotsky 1986[1934]: 242).
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Strangely, Vygotsky did not illustrate the syntax of inner speech by providing 
examples from his observation protocols (Van der Veer, Valsiner 1991: 366). 
Instead, he gives analogies from literature and ordinary speech,12 where previous 
contextual knowledge is available in the discourse, e.g. the case of answering a 
question; a situation in which the subject of the sentence is known to both the 
speaker and the listener who form a unified situation and discourse (Vygotsky 
1986[1934]: 236); the example of Levin’s declaration of love to Kitty from Tolstoy’s 
Anna Karenina (Vygotsky 1986[1934]: 237) and others.
While in inner speech, syntax and sound are reduced to minimum, semantics 
comes in the forefront. Referring to Paulhan’s work (1928), Vygotsky (1986[1934]: 
244–246) claimed that in egocentric and inner speech, sense [smysl] dominates 
over word meaning, signification [znachenie]. In this terminology, the sense of 
a word is the accumulated sum of individual experiences, a dynamic, fluid, and 
complex whole with several inner zones of stability, while the word meaning, 
the “dictionary meaning” is shared within a community as one of these zones, 
perhaps the most precise and stable one. A word appearing in a particular context 
adopts both a narrower and a broader sense, it changes in minds and situations, 
deriving its particular sense from the sentence and, in turn, the paragraph and 
the text. In this view, the relation of word to thought “is not a thing but a process, 
a continual movement back and forth from thought to word and from word to 
thought” (Vygotsky 1986[1934]: 218). In social speech the central, conventional 
word meanings dominate over particular experiences, while in inner speech the 
sense dominates over the meaning, the sentence over the word, and the context 
over the sentence (Vygotsky 1986[1934]: 245–246). The different reactions to 
words in different people are different senses (sometimes different connotations), 
while signification is shared by all people:
Th e linguistic milieu, with its stable, permanent words meanings, charts the way 
that the child’s generalizations will take. But, constrained as it is, the child’s thinking 
proceeds along this preordained path in the manner characteristic of the child’s own 
stage of intellectual development. Adults, through their verbal communication with 
the child, are able to predetermine the path of the development of generalizations 
and its fi nal point – a fully formed concept. But the adult cannot pass on to the child 
his mode of thinking. He merely supplies the ready-made meanings of the words, 
around which the child builds complexes. (Vygotsky 1986[1934]: 120)
12 Vygotsky borrows these examples from Lev Yakubinskij’s paper “On dialogical speech” 
(1928), which had already given examples of abbreviated speech such as monosyllabic answers, 
explicit comparison of written and normal speech, the example from Tolstoy’s Anna Karenina, 
and another one from Dostoevsky’s Diary of a Writer (Wertsch 1985a: 86–88; Van der Veer, 
Valsiner 1991: 368). Both Bakhtin and Lotman also adopted the same examples.
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Speech becomes part of the solution itself by school age, when the child becomes 
able to solve problems through an entirely internal process – intellectually, free 
of the present perceptual field – but of course in many tasks external aid remains 
irreplaceable. Also the development of internal thought and practical intelligence 
in the direction of socialization, as well as in communication of experience and 
practical thinking to other people, is not finished at this point.
The cultural development of concepts in children
Not only is it important how, during their acquisition, culturally shared symbols 
structurally change psychological functioning as its constituents and organizers, 
but also what kind of changes take place in their own development in the 
relationship between thinking and its external and internal context.
As Van der Veer and Valsiner (1991: 166–167) note, if in the middle of the 
1920s Vygotsky’s focus was on a structure of reactions united by a dominant, then 
by the end of his life he began to view word meaning as the unit of analysis. The 
idea of ‘the unit’ was that the structure of the behaviour as a whole had features 
different from the sum of its composite elements, thus structure was to be taken 
as the unit, rather than its constituents, the conditioned reflexes. 
Word meanings bear the mediating role in individual thinking of a person, as 
they transform and organize elementary, concrete experience. Thus, words are 
means for forming concepts, in which the sensory material is incorporated into 
conceptual structures. The main characteristic of words, though, is that they do 
not “refer to a single object, but to a group or to a class of objects” (Vygotsky 
1986[1934]: 6). 
Vygotsky (1986[1934]: 5–7) argues that the difference between sensation and 
thought is the generalized reflection of reality in the latter, which also happens 
to be the essence of word meaning – therefore an act of thought. A word without 
meaning is an “empty sound”, no longer human speech; hence, meaning must be 
an inalienable part of the word itself, belonging to both the realms of language 
and thought. Learning an expression of the word and associating it with an object 
itself will not lead to formation of concepts; because the association can either 
strengthen or weaken, expand by new connections of similar things or disband, the 
relation itself does not change (Vygotsky 1986[1934]: 213–216). From that point 
of view, word meaning cannot develop at all. The idea of individual associations 
between spoken words and surrounding things leaves semantics unaccounted for. 
Without class, there is only correspondence of words to existing objects, no class 
relations, and only horizontal hierarchy. Therefore, it is not only the expression, 
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but also the meaning that begins to structure the experience. At the same time, 
thought without its expression is pure abstraction – without history, origin, and 
development. In word meanings, “the internal aspect of the word”, thinking and 
speech are united in verbal thinking (Vygotsky 1986[1934]: 5–6). While both the 
phonetic side and thinking can be studied separately in principle, the study of the 
relationship between speech and thinking is essentially the study of their unity – 
the word meaning, which has all the characteristics of the whole. 
Communication requires a system of means. Vygotsky (1986[1934]: 7) argues 
that it was often thought that the expression of the word, the sound, was the 
means of communication that could then be associated with any experience and 
thus convey the same content between people. He finds that what is really shared 
in communication is both the expression and its content, their “live union”. In 
interpersonal communication, the content is not an experience or thought, but its 
generalization – the word meaning. There is no other way to share an experience 
or thought with another person but to refer to it by a category or class known 
by both communicating participants – psychologically, the word meaning as the 
shared concept.
In “Thinking and speech” (1934) Vygotsky sets out to analyse how children’s 
concrete concepts develop into abstract concepts by the way they comprehend 
word meanings, tracing its stages from the early use of verbal signs until their 
full formation during adolescence. As already explained in case of speech as a 
“higher function”  – in the beginning of the development, there is a concrete, 
external, factual relationship between the expression of the word and ‘the thing’, 
not ‘the symbol’ and its ‘object’ (Vygotsky 1986[1934]: 92–93, 105, 133) – there is 
no internal ready-made concept. For the child, the word is at first a characteristic 
or a property of the thing itself. The development of word meanings relies on this 
“objective connection between the word and the thing” (Vygotsky 1997: 105) that 
the child and the adult socially share. In the beginning, words as other external 
stimuli belong to the situation as a whole, together with its accompanying gestures, 
other objects and activities, e.g. the vocalization for ‘mother’ goes together with 
the grasping movement, an object, and the mother, and can be translated as 
something like “Mum, pass me the ball”. As the child’s use of speech is situated in 
its extralinguistic context, its external structure is acquired first. From this point 
on, conceptual thinking starts differentiating from ‘perceptual thinking’, guided by 
communication with culturally articulate adults – mediated by speech.
To differentiate the meaning of the word (an expression) from its reference, 
the thing that the word denotes, Vygotsky (1986[1934]: 130–131) adopts Husserl’s 
famous example of ‘winner at Jena’ and ‘loser at Waterloo’ and adopts the terms 
‘meaning’ [znachenie; intension], and extralinguistic reference, or ‘object reference’ 
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[predmetnaya otnessennost’]. Vygotsky then argues that “using this terminology”, 
“the child’s and the adult’s words coincide in their referents but not in their 
meanings” (Vygotsky 1986[1934]: 131), as the latter may result from different 
operations. Subsequently, in the case of concept development, he applies this new 
terminology to his findings, saying that what must be studied are changing word 
meanings, while referents remain the same, as the child and the adult rely on 
different psychological operations when thinking about the object. Thus, when 
children acquire language, they adopt word meanings referentially (in other words 
contextually, and concretely – a ‘ball’ is associated with personal experiences with a 
particular ball), forming a concrete concept as the meaning of the word.
As concept formation cannot be studied directly, Vygotsky observes it in 
children’s functional use of words, trying to derive it from the way children 
“operate” with word meanings  – the way children understand them. He does 
not deny concept formation as an individual process, but maintains that it 
is predetermined by the meanings of words that they have already met in 
the speech of adults (Vygotsky 1986[1934]: 120). The development of word 
meanings as individuals use them is therefore culturally guided since the earliest 
communicative contact with caretakers and the surrounding culture. However, the 
development of children’s concepts and, thus, the way children comprehend words, 
does not take place as a result of a sudden spontaneous discovery  – concepts 
as categories do not appear as ready-made – but entails a stage-like process of 
cultural development as with other psychological functions.
Vygotsky’s studies of concept formation in children relied on earlier experi-
mental work by Lev Sakharov and the famous experiments by Narziß Ach13, which 
Vygotsky continued and developed, but as all details of his own experimental 
setting and results are scarce, the relationship of his conclusions to his experiments 
unfortunately remains vague (Van der Veer; Valsiner 1991: 267).
Vygotsky (1986[1934]: 110–124) outlines the development of concepts in three 
main stages, but at least a preliminary stage can be added for, although Vygotsky 
does not appear to develop the idea much, Vygotsky and Luria note:
[…] the earliest fl owering of the most complex sign operation occurs as early 
as in the system of purely natural forms of behaviour, and thus [...] the higher 
functions have their ‘pre-natal’ period of development linking them with the 
natural foundation of the child’s psyche. (Vygotsky; Luria 1994: 148)
13 Vygotsky used the following work: Ach, Narziß Kaspar 1921. Über die Begriff sbildung. Eine 
experimentelle Untersuchung. Bamberg: C. C. Buchners Verlag.
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This early transitional stage in the development of symbols, perhaps analogous 
to signs used in communication of other species, precedes development in ‘word 
meanings’, or it is a simpler form of its early steps in which speech has not yet come 
to be the means for organizing thinking. By the apparent behaviour, before the age 
of one, “the pyramid of concepts is built specifically from non-differentiation of 
the particular; the child goes from the general to the particular, gradually isolating 
ever smaller groups and the single object is evidently isolated later” (Vygotsky 
1997: 247). However, the process of concept formation is not a quantitative growth 
of this early associative activity of the “immediate” intellectual processes, but a 
qualitatively new type (Vygotsky 1986[1934]: 109). 
At this early stage, the child’s perception and representation of the world is 
situational. In the development of concepts, word meaning initially denotes for 
the child a syncretic image of objects grouped or set together by rather accidental, 
inconsistent and undifferentiated perceptual characteristics, in which subjective 
impressions of relationships are taken for relations between actual objects. 
Syncretic thinking takes place in undifferentiated clusters of objects, in situations 
as wholes (Vygotsky 1997: 192). Objects do not need to have a common objective 
feature to be merged into the same syncretic set; e.g. a word meaning may be 
formed by an association of trial-and-error, or simply by how objects are located in 
relation to one another spatially or temporally in the surrounding situation. Word 
meanings may often be extended to cover entire situations.
On the one hand, at this early stage words appear similar to proper names 
(“whose sole function is that of reference”, Vygotsky 1986[1934]: 131), having a 
direct associative relationship between the word and a concrete object (the cluster). 
On the other hand, words often function as entire grammatically undifferentiated 
propositions, as “a whole sentence in meaning” (Vygotsky 1997: 88), denoting both 
a thing and a specific activity related to the thing14.
A thing might carry a different name in a different situation because of be-
longing to a different complex. Conversely, a specific word may appear to have 
14 In this context, Vygotsky argues that early structures are propositionally “undiff erentiated” 
and that the “external consideration” that “the child is at fi rst pronouncing separate sounds, 
then separate words, and later begins to unite the words in two’s and three’s and makes the 
transition to a simple sentence which later develops into a complex sentence and into a whole 
system of sentences” is “deceptive” (Vygotsky 1997: 88). It is in sharp contrast with the speech of 
a three-year-old, in “which each [word] precisely indicates and signifi es an object of action that 
constitutes the corresponding operation and grammatical relations that convey the relation 
between real objects” (Vygotsky 1997: 88). Th e diff erence between the ‘primitive structure’ and 
the ‘speech structure’ is that the initial cry is “an integral part in the merged complex of the 
situation”, but the “present speech [...] has lost the direct connection with action on objects”, 
and is shared both by the child and mother (Vygotsky 1997: 88).
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a completely different meaning in a different situation, as the use of the word 
is rather guided by the specific situation and the child’s subjective impressions 
than by the linguistic code. In sum, when a word is learned, its meaning is often 
extended to cover different contexts based on the child’s subjective impressions 
of their contextual similarities, rather than objective features or linguistic 
conventions.
During this early stage, the child’s use of words may align with the adults’ use 
in reference to the same objects, but it is the result of a different psychological 
operation. Communication between children and adults is possible, because 
the meanings of words they employ are often ‘functionally equivalent’15 in their 
shared everyday contexts, as the referents in their surrounding world of objects 
are the same (Vygotsky 1986[1934]: 101). As the child’s use of words is highly 
dependent on concrete situational contexts, caretakers might still comprehend 
their meanings, as far as they share the child’s experience of usage.
While in the syncretic stage, classes are formed through grouping of external 
objects; later they come to be based on (particular) features that objects share. 
These features relate to one another as objects relate to one another. Yet Vygotsky 
(1986[1934]: 199) maintains that “verbal thought is no more than a dependent 
component of perceptual, object-determined thought”.
During the second stage in the development of word meanings in children, 
objects are grouped into complexes, also called everyday concepts16, in which 
they are no longer related to one another only by subjective impressions, but by 
objective factual features and relations between them. However, because of their 
unsystematic character and dependence on individual experience, the unstable 
criteria for the selection of elements into a set, often based on similarity, contrast 
or proximity, may still appear irrelevant or secondary from the point of view of an 
adult. Complexes are mainly formed by family resemblance, words functioning 
in communication similar to family names (Vygotsky 1986[1934]: 113), but in 
contrast to syncretic images in the previous stage – and importantly for further 
development – elements in them maintain their individual differences. Vygotsky 
divides the development of complexes into five substages described here as pure 
types, while in development, mixed forms often occur.
First, in associative complexes a relationship is established between the 
central core of the complex and any new member to the group, but the criteria 
15 A term Vygotsky borrowed from Dimitrij Usnadze.
16 Th e term ‘spontaneous concepts’, originally used by Piaget, refers to those concepts that 
children develop on their own, whereas Vygotsky prefers the term ‘everyday concepts’”, as he 
suggests that even spontaneous concepts have a social component brought to them from the 
sociocultural environment.
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for selection may change during the operation at every step, each member being 
related to the set by a new characteristic. First, a new element may be added by 
similarity in colour, the second element by shape, then by size, etc.
Secondly, complexes are formed by grouping elements into collections, where 
sets of elements are based on their complementarity in concrete functional 
contexts. Complexes like this are often compiled based on participation of objects 
in the same practical operation, e.g. the child may include a fork, a knife, and 
a spoon in a class of objects as they are all included in an eating situation, but 
not include, say, a glass and a vase. Children are able to group on the grounds 
of difference as a quality in itself, e.g. to compile a set of all different colours. 
Compared to associative complexes, where elements are chosen by similarity, 
collections are often characterized by “contrast” (Vygotsky 1986[1934]: 114).
Chain complexes are in a way similar to associative complexes, except that they 
lack a distinct core centre around which to build. Instead, the child includes each 
new element by an association to the last one, and the grounds for joining each 
new element may be different from the previous one. The process of grouping 
objects may take any direction – having selected triangles, the child may go on 
by selecting yellow objects, just because the last triangle happened to be yellow. 
Importantly, though, all single elements are added to the set as equal members.
Next, in diffuse complexes the classification is based on somewhat random 
and bold over-generalizations of characteristics taken as the ground for selection. 
For example, the child may pick a trapezoid after a triangle, because it roughly 
resembles triangles by some of its features. In further usage, the generalized feature 
that has given ground for the selection of a particular member may become clearer 
itself.
Finally, in pseudo-concepts, the most common kind of thinking in pre-
schoolers (Vygotsky 1986[1934]: 119), children start forming sets more or less 
on the bases of common features. One abstract characteristic is chosen and 
differentiated or marked as the ground for the selection into the group, whereas 
the group is still a result of a “primitive” experiential association rather than a 
logical operation. Overtly, pseudo-concepts may appear similar to scientific 
concepts formed at the next stage, but they are still derived by an operation with 
concrete objects (Vygotsky 1986[1934]: 119). Thus, complexes are still formed on 
referential or contextual bases, not on the bases of relationships between abstract 
meanings themselves, e.g. at this stage, triangles are grouped, based on their 
concrete perceptual features, rather than on a formal definition.
Pseudo-concepts are an example of how word meanings in older children 
and educated adults (may potentially) already align in use, whereas they still 
understand each other qualitatively differently  – the child from the “point of 
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view” of concrete concepts, an educated adult in abstract terms. The child using 
“pseudo-concepts” does not differentiate a concrete object from an abstract object.
The use of scientific concepts, or concepts proper (“real concepts”, e.g. 
Vygotsky 1986[1934]: 121) is characteristic of adult thinking (while it constitutes 
only a certain type of adult thinking, which fluctuates between different levels 
as a whole), and actually starts to develop at school age. The term ‘scientific’ is 
somewhat deceptive, as it does not so much refer to concepts specifically used in 
science, but to a certain type of organization of thought.
In scientific concepts, all the elements are grouped based on the same denoted 
characteristic or feature and related to one another in the same precise way. While 
everyday concepts are derived from concrete and factual experience, scientific 
concepts are formed in such a way that all its elements are themselves generalized 
abstract features, independent of things and phenomena as particular objects:
To form such a concept it is also necessary to abstract, to single out elements, and 
to view the abstracted elements apart from the totality of the concrete experience 
in which they are embedded. (Vygotsky 1986[1934]: 135)
In the beginning, all of the child’s concepts belong to one horizontal row or line 
of experience without internal hierarchy. The reason is that they are externally, 
immediately related to, or refer directly to objects, not to a class of objects. 
Without “equivalency of concepts” (Vygotsky 1986[1934]: 200), an object can only 
be expressed through itself, and thus a hierarchical construction of concepts is 
impossible. In concepts proper, a concept can be explained through other concepts 
(e.g. in a number system by the ordinal and cardinal relations between numbers).
Scientific concepts (e.g. terms) are (at least potentially) used to systematize, 
to form hierarchized classifications and to define in integration within a (formal) 
system of symbols in relation to one another. The relations between formal 
concepts are reversible, even though operations in the process of activity are 
irreversible. Scientific concepts are first formed in the verbal environment and 
only afterwards related or applied to particular situations. In the surrounding 
environment, they make possible systematic study of objects which are unat-
tainable directly, e.g., the study of molecules, atoms, or whales as mammals – 
requiring no direct individual experience of whales. They afford a systematic 
description of the world that is not experienced “directly”. Sometimes scientific 
concepts have no relation to the surrounding world of things at all.
Vygotsky did not provide a reliable way how to differentiate between pseudo-
concepts and concepts proper in practice (Van der Veer; Valsiner 1991: 267), as 
they appear very similar to each other functionally. The difference appears to lie 
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in the fact that while adults are able to define a triangle, and then, based on the 
definition, differentiate triangles from among other geometrical shapes, pseudo-
concepts are formed based on perceptual similarity of the particular shapes at 
hand – in concrete thought.
While in general concept development takes place from a lower level of thought 
towards a higher one, scientific concepts develop from the higher towards the 
lower levels. Children adopt their use in interaction with parents. “Spontaneous” 
concepts arise from (immediate) experience with things, even if guided by inter-
actions with adults. Scientific concepts, on the other hand, arise from mediated 
relations with things – they start with a concept and then “grow into its structure” 
(Vygotsky 1986[1934]: 193–194). Development of proper concepts takes place 
when concrete concepts related to particular experienced things develop into 
abstract concepts as classes. Some sign systems (e.g. writing and numeral systems) 
enable children to change from the use of spontaneous or everyday concepts, tied 
to their concrete contexts of usage to abstract scientific concepts (yet they are still 
always contextual within the thought as a whole, in its constituents), and some 
(educational) settings explicitly relate the two types of thinking. In fact, a proper 
concept is formed only when the abstracted traits are newly synthesized and the 
resulting abstract synthesis becomes the main instrument of thought (Vygotsky 
1986[1934]: 139)17. Formal symbols are thus applied to concrete experience within 
their contexts (e.g., with their aid, individual apples can be counted by selecting 
a single generalized feature, the quantity), which in turn gives ground to sharing 
this kind of thought with other people (instead of presenting them an apple each, 
their number can be given).
The availability of concepts and awareness of them do not coincide either by 
the moment of their appearance, nor their function. Analyses of the surrounding 
environment by a concept appear earlier and might be completely independent 
of the analyses of the concept itself. The development of scientific concepts 
brings awareness of concepts, as they do not refer directly to experience, but to 
other concepts (Vygotsky 1986[1934]: 282). At first there is no awareness of one’s 
own thought (i.e. metacognition – although it seems that Vygotsky occasionally 
identifies awareness of one’s own thought with consciousness). At first, individual 
elementary functions (e.g. perception and memory) are undifferentiated, and 
there is no awareness of individual functions. Attention itself is a function of 
perception and memory and emerges, once the two differentiate in awareness. 
17 Toomela (2017: 50–53) argues that based on Vygotsky’s writings, scientifi c concepts and 
proper concepts can be separated into two stages of thought: while scientifi c concepts are formal-
logical, proper concepts bring into awareness the (formal) system of thought itself as a whole.
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Systematizing concepts draws attention to concepts and thus leads to an awareness, 
and subsequent control, of them (Vygotsky 1986[1934]: 174). While spontaneous 
concepts concern the situational, empirical, and practical, the strength of scientific 
concepts lies in their conscious and deliberate character (Vygotsky 1986[1934]: 
194).
Conclusion
The paper organized the topic of signs in Vygotsky’s various writings into a 
coherent whole. The process of inclusion of symbolic signs within the behaviour 
of the child and an account of various changes in psychological functions that it 
brings along were outlined to study the role of symbols in the individual behaviour.
As research into the behaviour of humans and other animals excluded language 
and symbols from their comparison, and the psychology of language sought 
to study acquisition of speech by considering language an independent system 
with its own internal rules, Vygotsky’s predecessors apparently did not see 
language within the context of behaviour and psychological functioning as a 
whole. Language was seen merely as an abstract system, not as an activity, nor 
as something that generalizes and organizes experience within the surrounding 
environment. It was not realized that it may have a specific form at each stage of 
development. Even if language was taken as a means of communication of ideas, 
it appeared external to individual thought.
Vygotsky argues that for speech, action is not only an object; it is an activity 
and process itself, and should therefore be included among other psychological 
functions. He also suggests that to understand the specificity of human behaviour, 
various psychological functions should not be studied separately, but in their 
interrelations as an organized system. Observing the “lower functions” similar 
in many species, e.g. perception, attention, memory etc., in their interrelations 
with the “higher functions” which include the use of conventional sign systems – 
speech, writing, numeral systems, maps etc.  – developed in cultural histories 
and passed from generation to generation, he outlines a developmental history 
which leads to children becoming full participants within their cultures. Vygotsky 
understood culture in terms of sign systems (Wertsch, Tulviste 2005: 66).
In the case of humans, language and thought are progressively intertwined 
during child development, so that language comes to organize behaviour. Acqui-
sition of symbol use is fundamentally a social process that changes indivi dual 
thinking. Symbols as human-specific natural, organic forms of interacting and 
engaging with their environments, bring along their interpersonal, cultural-
historical origin and nature in addition to their cognitive components. The 
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human-specific cognitive processes have their individual and sociocultural 
aspects, which do not develop parallel to these processes, but in integration with 
them.
In this process a line of developmental history is formed, which includes 
symbols among the factors in its own formation, and does not coincide with the 
line of organic maturation of the child, although both become merged in one single 
line of ontogeny. Vygotsky calls this line of development the natural history of 
signs (or sign operations). In case of conventional symbols, this history appears to 
explain how very small differences between humans and their close evolutionary 
relatives regarding the perceptual apparatuses and the isolated behavioural and 
cognitive capacities create such great discrepancies in their actual behaviour – in 
the entire variety of sign systems that they use, in societies organized as cultures, 
and in the effect that they have on the entire variety of the environments they 
inhabit. While constrained by organic maturation, the sociocultural development 
of human beings follows laws similar or analogous to historical development, in 
which means and functions characteristic of, and available in, earlier stages are 
replaced by and lead to new means and functions. 
The beginning of complex sign operations takes place very early, but there 
are many intermediate forms of natural and cultural behaviours between early 
elementary and the higher behaviour. Genetically, functionally, and structurally, 
higher behaviour is any behaviour which includes mastering one’s own 
behaviour (Vygotsky, Luria 1994: 164). Higher mental functions are a result of 
the development of mediated activity, in which mediators are conventional 
signs. The use of these psychological aids provides greater freedom of behaviour, 
which enables humans to adapt their surrounding environment according to 
their needs significantly more, and in a qualitatively different way, compared 
to other species. Compared to other animals, humans influence their relations 
with their environments to a much larger extent. In symbolic activity, the 
structure of the activity and psychological functions is organized by inclusion 
of conventional signs as its structural centre and dominant. In the beginning, 
signs are “indistinguishable from all other stimuli”, including the objects they 
must designate (Vygotsky 1986[1934]: 102). Internal signifying activity is initially 
undifferentiated from the external activity. Signs are “intellectualized” only in 
time, as their semantic aspect starts developing from within the context, as they 
start functioning as generalized symbols. This involves substituting external 
stimuli with internal stimuli – children do not only change their responses or 
reactions towards the environment, but also the ways in which they arrive to these 
responses by creating and adding new means to operations and substituting some 
psychological function with others. For Vygotsky, signs do not change anything in 
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their object directly, but are a means of internal activity to control oneself.
Vygotsky was not entirely consistent in his terminology that we would take as 
semiotic today. The change in the various ways Vygotsky approached the topic 
of signs, although these are compatible with one another in principle, follows 
the development of Vygotsky as a researcher. Various works indeed contain 
discussions of signs as tools as “the connection between practical action and 
symbolic forms of thinking” to uncover the specifically human forms of practical 
intellect in the child and their main lines of development (Vygotsky, Luria 1994: 
102). Still, developmental changes in the structure of problem solving are just 
instances of a broader psychological and symbolic activity that involves the entire 
organization of human psychological functioning, to which the metaphor of 
signs as tools does not extend, as Vygotsky (e.g. 1997: 60–61) himself realized. 
Signs are instruments in the same way as speech can be used as a means to an 
end. In this paper, the central position of signs was outlined in relation to various 
psychological functions, including signs as tools in Vygotsky’s analyses of the 
development of the human psyche as a whole.
Acquisition of linguistic signs and their inclusion in the behaviour brings 
many changes to interrelations between various psychological functions. The 
relationship between thinking and its environment will change and symbols 
become part of the child’s environment. Symbols enable selection of relevant 
operations from among other possible operations (in their semantic aspect). The 
child becomes able to pick a relevant point of view from possible other points to 
describe a situation, to pick words purposefully, to select pencils for drawing, etc. 
Symbols enable children to take into consideration not only one, but a number 
of perceptual fields at the same time, observe the same situation from various 
points of view, compare various possible sequences of events, and many other 
operations, which involve purposeful distinction of point of attention in relation 
to its situational hic et nunc. Symbols enable control not only over other objects, 
but also over the child’s own behaviour as an object (Vygotsky, Luria 1994: 111). 
The child becomes his or her own subject and object of behaviour, mastering it 
by preliminary organization and planning the way the he or she masters external 
objects. When joined with practical thinking, speech enables planned operations, 
which, when executed, stimulate and iterate development in their own structure. 
Thinking, in this view, is internal organization of experience for the purposes of 
planning a following action. As a distinct and separate psychological function, it 
appears from among other functions when it starts preparing the behaviour of the 
organism as its organizer.
At first, speech is purely social, intermental, interpersonal. Only then, once 
speech is already socially functional, does it start to organize individual activity. As 
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signs are first taken into use for socializing, and only then for internal purposes, it 
follows that cultural development itself is based on the use of symbols. The whole 
system of cultural behaviour initially occurs in a social, external form, all higher 
functions passing through an “external stage” (Vygotsky 1997: 105). Speech for 
one’s own purposes, specifically distinct in egocentric and inner speech, develops 
as means of thinking, of organizing the child’s own activities, rather than a means 
of communication. At the beginning of the development, the child is highly 
dependent on external means, but in time the symbolic activity starts functioning 
as an internal process – conceptually.
Verbal symbols do not remain the same over the course of psychological 
development of their usage, but go through a stage-like development of changes 
in the interrelations between speech, thought, and their context. During this 
development, communication and thought that relies on concrete experience 
dependent on the situation at hand is gradually substituted with generalized word 
meanings, as the conceptual level of language differentiates within the thought 
process. Thus, children’s intentions and goals acquire the shape of the intentions 
and goals of their parents, teachers, peers and other relevant people. Before adults’ 
concepts are fully developed and functional, and formal concepts can be taken into 
use, there are several early forms of concepts. During this development, conceptual 
thinking takes it shape, and generalized word meanings are internalized to 
organize individual thinking.
One of the main strengths of Vygotsky’s approach is that it is developmental – 
i.e. phenomena are studied in the process of their formation, which brings forth 
the formation of signs in the individual. Vygotsky demonstrated that mental 
functioning, signs and the use of signs do not remain the same during the 
development of children’s activities, but change. Vygotsky provides an alternative 
for strictly “mentalistic” and “individualistic” approaches to mind and knowledge, 
which take processes of thinking and knowledge as if occurring within the head 
only, situating them in the activities taking place in the surrounding world. 
Vygotsky’s view on ‘mind’ extends beyond the skin (Wertsch, Tulviste 2005: 66) – 
he does not take the mind, cognition, memory etc. as closed in individuals, but 
extending on to the surrounding material and social environment.
References
Bühler, Charlotte 1930[1927]. The First Year of Life. (Greenberg, Pearl; Ripin, Rowena, trans.) 
New York: The John Day Company.
Bühler, Karl 1930[1929]. The Mental Development of the Child: A Summary of Modern 
Psychological Theory. (Oeser, Oscar, trans.) London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co.
 Vygotsky’s natural history of signs 303
Daniels, Harry; Cole, Michael; Wertsch, James V. (eds.) 2007. The Cambridge Companion to 
Vygotsky. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Köhler, Wolfgang 1925[1921]. The Mentality of Apes. (Winter, Ella, trans.) London: Kegan Paul, 
Trench, Trubner & Co.
Liu, Charlotte Hua 2011. Vygotsky’s Psycho-semiotics: Theories, Instrument and Interpretive 
Analyses. Bern: Peter Lang.
Nöth, Winfried 2009. On the instrumentality and semiotic agency of signs, tools, and intelligent 
machines. Cybernetics and Human Knowing 16(3/4): 11–36.
Rieber, Robert (ed.) 1999. The Collected Works of L. S. Vygotsky. Vol. 6: Scientific Legacy. New 
York: Kluwer Academic/Plenum. [Retranslated from the Russian version, previously 
translated from the English version by Vygotsky and Luria (1994).]
Robbins, Dorothy 2001. Vygotsky’s Psychology-Philosophy: A Metaphor for Language Theory and 
Learning. New York: Kluwer Academic/Plenum.
–  2003. Vygotsky’s and A. A. Leontiev’s Semiotics and Psycholinguistics. Applications for Edu-
cation, Second Language Acquisition, and Theories of Language. Westport: Praeger.
Stetsenko, Anna 2003. Alexander Luria and the cultural-historical activity theory: Pieces for the 
history of an outstanding collaborative project in psychology. Review of E. D. Homskaya 
(2001), Alexander Romanovich Luria: A scientific biography. Mind, Culture, and Activity 
10(1): 93–97.
–  2004. Scientific legacy. “Tool and sign in the development of the child”. In: Rieber, Robert; 
Robinson, David (eds.), The Essential Vygotsky. New York: Kluwer Academic/Plenum, 501–
512.
Toomela, Aaro 2017. Minu Ise areng: inimlapsest Inimeseks. Tartu: Väike Vanker.
Van der Veer, René; Valsiner, Jaan 1991. Understanding Vygotsky: A Quest for Synthesis. 
Cambridge: Blackwell.
–  (eds.) 1994. The Vygotsky Reader. Cambridge: Blackwell.
Van der Veer, René; Yasnitsky, Anton 2016a. Vygotsky the published: Who wrote Vygotsky and 
what Vygotsky actually wrote. In: Yasnitsky, Anton; van der Veer, René (eds.), Revisionist 
Revolution in Vygotsky Studies. Hove: Routledge, 73–93.
–  2016b. Translating Vygotsky: Some problems of transnational Vygotskian science. In: 
Yasnitsky, Anton; van der Veer, René (eds.), Revisionist Revolution in Vygotsky Studies. 
Hove: Routledge, 143–174.
Vygotsky, Lev 1978. Mind in Society: The Development of Higher Psychological Processes. (Cole, 
Michael; John-Steiner, Vera; Scribner, Sylvia; Souberman, Ellen, eds.) Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press.
–  1994[1929]. The problem of the cultural development of the child. (Prout, Theresa, trans.). 
In: Van der Veer, René; Valsiner, Jaan (eds.), The Vygotsky Reader. Oxford: Blackwell, 57–72.
–  1997. The history of the development of higher mental functions. In: The Collected Works 
of L. S. Vygotsky, Vol. 4. (Rieber, Robert W., ed.; Hall, Marie J., trans.) New York: Plenum 
Press. [Originally from 1931. First five chapters published in 1960.]
–  1986[1934]. Thought and Language. (Kozulin, Alex, trans.) Cambridge: The MIT Press. [In 
original, Thinking and Speech.]
Vygotsky, Lev; Luria, Alexander 1994. Tool and symbol in child development. (Prout, Theresa, 
trans.) In: Van der Veer, René; Valsiner, Jaan (eds.), The Vygotsky Reader. Oxford: Blackwell, 
99–174. [1930 – unpublished original.]
304 Lauri Linask
Wertsch, James V. (ed.) 1985a. Culture, Communication, and Cognition: Vygotskian Perspectives. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
–  1985b. Vygotsky and the Social Formation of Mind. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
–  1985c. The semiotic mediation of mental life: L. S. Vygotsky and M. M. Bakhtin. In: Mertz, 
Elizabeth; Parmentier, Richard J. (eds.), Semiotic Mediation: Sociocultural and Psychological 
Perspectives. Orlando: Academic Press, 49–69.
–  1991. Voices of the Mind  – A Sociocultural Approach to Mediated Action. Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press.
Wertsch, James V.; Tulviste, Peeter 2005. L. S. Vygotsky and contemporary developmental 
psychology. In: Daniels, Harry (ed.), An Introduction to Vygotsky. London: Routledge.
Yasnitsky, Anton 2016. Unity in diversity: The Vygotsky–Luria circle as an informal personal 
network of scholars. In: Yasnitsky, Anton; van der Veer, René (eds.), Revisionist Revolution 
in Vygotsky Studies. Hove: Routledge, 27–49.
Лев Выготский и естественная история знаков
Статья объединяет тему знаков в различных работах Льва Выготского в единое целое 
для изучения роли знаков в развитии ребенка. Выготский связал конвенциональные 
знаки, которыми люди пользуются в общении и которые принадлежат истории культуры 
в течение нескольких поколений в историческое время, с психологическими функциями 
индивидов. “Естественная история знаков” Выготского изучает возникновение и раз-
витие символической деятельности. В статье описывается процесс включения символов 
в поведение ребенка и рассматриваются сопутствующие изменения психологических 
функций. В ходе культурного развития появляются специфически человеческие фор-
мы поведения, а отношение детей к социальной и материальной среде качественно 
меняется. Выготский описывает процесс использования знака и анализирует этапы его 
развития. Подход Выготского объясняет, как использование различных систем знаков 
формирует познавательные процессы в человеке, ребенке, а также когнитивное развитие 
в целом.
Lev Võgotski ja märkide looduslugu
Käesolevas töös uuritakse märkide rolli laste arengus, korrastades selleks koherentseks tervikuks 
mitmete Lev Võgotski kirjutiste märgitemaatika. Võgotski sidus inimestevahelisest suhtlusest 
pärit konventsionaalsed märgid, mis kuuluvad kultuuriajalukku (mis toimub põlvkonniti 
ajaloolise aja jooksul), individuaalsete inimeste psühholoogiliste funktsioonidega. Võgotski 
„märkide looduslugu“ uurib, kuidas sümboliline tegevus tekib ja kujuneb. Käesolevas töös 
kirjeldatakse põhijooned, kuidas sümbolid laste käitumisse seotakse, ning käsitletakse sellega 
kaasnevate psühholoogiliste funktsioonide ja nendevaheliste suhete muutusi. Kultuurilise 
arengu käigus ilmuvad spetsiifiliselt inimestele omased käitumiste vormid, misläbi laste suhe 
nende sotsiaalsesse ja materiaalsesse keskkonda muutub kvalitatiivselt. Võgotski kirjeldab 
märgikasutuse kujunemist ja analüüsib selle arenguastmeid. Võgotski lähenemine selgitab, 
kuidas erinevate märgisüsteemide kasutamine muudab tunnetusprotsesse, mis leiavad aset 
inimeses, lapses ja kognitiivses arengus tervikuna. Võgotski lähenemist märgiprobleemile 
uuritakse selle ajaloolises mõistestikus.
